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INTRODUCTION
T HIS ARTICLE SUMMARIZES decisions and developments
in the field of aviation law from the year 2011. Rather than
trying to cover every possible development, it focuses on those
with the most potential significance. Its coverage ends as of De-
cember 31, 2011. Some decisions from early 2011, however,
were covered by the previous edition of this article and are
therefore excluded from this piece. The division of the discus-
sion below into substantive categories of law is done as a matter
of convenience based loosely on the more prominent features of
a particular case; obviously a case may involve more than one
area of law.
I. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
In Anyango v. Rolls-Royce Corp., the court affirmed a dismissal
on grounds of forum non conveniens.' The lawsuit arose out of
a helicopter accident in 2008 in Cranbrook, British Columbia.
2
On a flight to visually inspect power lines, "the helicopter lost
power and crashed to the ground," killing a Kenyan student as
he was on his way to mail a letter to his parents in Kenya.' The
parents filed a wrongful-death suit in Indiana, where the heli-
copter's engine had been manufactured in 1973 by a corporate
predecessor of Rolls-Royce.4 Certain engine components had
been designed in Indiana at a Honeywell International, Inc. fa-
cility and manufactured in North Carolina.5 Bell Helicopter
Textron, Inc. manufactured the helicopter in Texas; at the time
of the suit, all the records related to the helicopter's design and
certification were in Quebec, Canada.6
1 953 N.E.2d 1147, 1152 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
2 Id. at 1149.
3 Id. at 1150.
4 Id. at 1149-50.
5 Id. at 1149.
6 Id. at 1149-50.
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The defendants moved to dismiss on forum non conveniens
grounds, arguing that British Columbia was a more suitable
venue "because the accident and accident investigation oc-
curred there, all physical evidence and witnesses [were] located
there, and a similar lawsuit filed by the pilot's and passengers'
estates [was] pending there as well."7 The plaintiffs opposed the
motion, arguing that in Canada "only nominal substantive dam-
ages would be available to them," as opposed to Indiana, where,
they asserted, their case would have a "significant seven figure
value."' The trial court dismissed the case, and the plaintiffs
appealed.9
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the dismissal was error
because British Columbia provided "no economically adequate
remedy," while the defendants countered that, even if the case
were to remain in Indiana, British Columbia substantive law
would apply regardless. 10 The appellate court affirmed the dis-
missal, holding that under the choice-of-law rules of Indiana,
the lex loci delicti principle would indeed require the application
of British Columbia law." Even aside from that issue, the appel-
late court determined that the trial court did not act unreasona-
bly in dismissing the case: a British Columbia court would be an
adequate alternative forum, and the balance of private factors
(e.g., ease of access to sources of proof) and public factors (e.g.,
local interest in having localized disputes decided at home and
unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury
duty) favored a trial in British Columbia.' 2
In Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S.,'- the Eleventh Circuit found that the
district court generally did not abuse its discretion when it dis-
missed, on forum non conveniens grounds, wrongful-death
claims arising from the worst aviation disaster in Brazilian his-
tory.' 4 On July 17, 2007, TAM Linhas Areas Flight 3054 over-
ran a runway while landing in Sdo Paulo, Brazil, crashing and
killing all 187 people on board the Airbus A320-233, as well as
twelve on the ground.' 5 One of the deceased, Roberto Tazoe,
7 Id. at 1150.
9 Id.
9 Id. at 1151.
10 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
11 Id.
12 See id. at 1152-53.
13 631 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011).
14 Id. at 1328.
15 Id.
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was a U.S. citizen, while the remainder of the deceased were
citizens or residents of Brazil. 6 The plaintiffs, family members
of the deceased, filed actions in the Southern District of Florida
against the airline, the aircraft leasing company, and the manu-
facturers of the Airbus. 7 The manufacturers, in turn, moved to
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. 8 In analyzing the
district court's decision to dismiss, the court of appeals sepa-
rated the plaintiffs into three categories: (1) Brazilian family
members, (2) the family of Roberto Tazoe, and (3) Anna
Finzsch, a Brazilian whose complaint was dismissed sua sponte
before service. 19 Although the Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismis-
sal of the complaints of the Brazilian family members and the
family of Roberto Tazoe, it reversed the district court's sua
sponte dismissal of Finzsch's complaint because the court did
not first afford her notice or an opportunity to be heard.20
Under the law of the Eleventh Circuit, "[t] he manufacturers
had to establish that (1) an adequate alternative forum [was]
available, (2) the public and private factors weigh[ed] in favor
of dismissal, and (3) the plaintiff [could] reinstate his suit in the
alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice. 21
The court of appeals first determined that Brazil was both an
"adequate" and "available" forum. 2 The court noted that the
manufacturers, in obtaining dismissal in the district court, con-
sented to accepting service of process in Brazil, tolling of any
statutes of limitations, making witnesses and documents availa-
ble in Brazil, and respecting any final judgment of a Brazilian
court.23 The court also noted that other federal courts had de-
termined that the Brazilian legal system provided adequate
remedies.2 4
The court then turned to an analysis of the public and private
factors.25 In analyzing the private factors, the court determined
that "[t] he record support[ed] the determination that Brazil of-
fer[ed] superior access to sources of proof," in that the flight
wreckage was in Brazil (including the cockpit voice recorder
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1329.
18 Id.
"9 Id. at 1328.
20 Id. at 1335-37.
21 Id. at 1330 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1330-31.
25 Id. at 1331.
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and digital flight data recorder) and because several govern-
ment investigations of the accident had also taken place in Bra-
zil. 26 The court also found it significant that the Southern
District of Florida lacked authority to compel the attendance of
Brazilian witnesses.2 7 Finally, the court noted that the manufac-
turers intended to implead Brazilian third parties but could not
do so in the Southern District of Florida.2 a
In analyzing the public factors, the Eleventh Circuit noted
that "[t] he record support[ed] the determination that the fam-
ily members' complaints [would] overburden the courts of the
United States. '29 The court further determined that Brazil had
a superior interest in resolution of the claims: "The accident
that is the subject of this litigation killed nearly 200 citizens or
residents of Brazil and was the worst accident in Brazilian avia-
tion history. Indeed, all but one of the victims were citizens of
Brazil. The interest of Brazil in resolving these claims is para-
mount."3"' Lastly, "[tlhe need to apply foreign law . . . also
favor [ed] dismissal. 31
Turning to the third and last factor of the forum non con-
veniens analysis, the Eleventh Circuit found that the manufac-
turers' stipulations regarding service of process, discovery, and
tolling of the applicable statutes of limitations were dispositive 2
Finally, the court noted that the claims of Roberto Tazoe's
family were due "'somewhat more deference,' as [the court was]
hesitant to deny citizens access to courts of the United States."33
However,
[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded
that material injustice [was] manifest with respect to the claims
of Tazoe's family members against the manufacturers. The dis-
trict court concluded that the "[m]anufacturing [d]efendants'
inability to compel third-party witnesses or the production of
documents from those witnesses, and the inability to implead po-
tentially liable third-parties, [was] both unusually extreme and
materially unjust."34
26 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
27 Id. at 1331-32.
28 Id. at 1332.
29 Id. at 1333.
30 Id. at 1334.
31 Id.
32 i. at 1334-35.
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The Eleventh Circuit thus affirmed dismissal of those claims as
well.3 5
In Bakeer v. Nippon Cargo Airlines, Co.,3 6 a report and recom-
mendation by a magistrate judge of the Eastern District of New
York that was later adopted by the district judge, the court de-
nied the defendant airline and staffing agencies' motion to dis-
miss for forum non conveniens.3 7 The defendant, Nippon
Cargo Airlines (NCA), and its staffing providers faced claims of
employment discrimination based on race, national origin, age,
citizenship, and alienage brought by three flight engineers and
the widow of a fourth.38 All four flight engineers (also known as
second officers) were Caucasian and were hired to fly Boeing
B747-200 airplanes (Classics) "on cargo routes in the United
States and to Japan." 9 The flight engineers, none of whom
were residents of New York, were terminated from their posi-
tions when NCA retired its Classics fleet and completed the
switchover to 74 7-400s, which could be flown without flight engi-
neers." The lawsuit followed, and defendants moved the court
for an order of dismissal'on forum non conveniens grounds,
contending that plaintiffs [had] no connection to the Eastern
District of New York, thatJapan, the alternative forum selected by
defendants, provid[ed] an adequate and suitable forum for adju-
dicating plaintiffs' claims, and that the balance of public and pri-
vate interests support[ed] the choice ofJapan as the appropriate
forum for [that] case.4
The district court applied the Second Circuit's three-step test
in adjudicating motions to dismiss based on forum non con-
veniens: first, determining "the degree of deference properly ac-
corded the plaintiffs choice of forum"; second, considering
whether the "alternative forum proposed by the defendants
[was] adequate to adjudicate the parties' dispute"; and finally,
35 Id.
36 Nos. 09 CV 3374, 3375, 3377, 3378 (RRM), 2011 WL 3625103 (E.D.N.Y. July
25, 2011) (Mag. J. Rep. & Rec.), affd, No. 09-CV-3374 (RRM)(CLP), 2011 WL
3625083 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2011); affd sub nom. Michaud v. Nippon Cargo Air-
lines, Co., No. 09-CV-3375 (RRM)(CLP), 2011 WL 5402642 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7,
2011); affd sub nora. Frith v. Nippon Cargo Airlines, Co., No. 09-CV-3378
(RRM)(CLP), 2011 WL 5429642 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2011).
37 Bakeer, 2011 WL 3625103, at *5.
38 Id. at *1.
39 !d.
40 Id. at *4.
41 Id. at *5 (footnote omitted).
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"balanc[ing] the private and public interests implicated in the
choice of forum. 42
The first prong of the test favored the plaintiffs. 43 The de-
fendants argued that the plaintiffs were "foreign plaintiffs" in
that none of them ever resided in New York.44 However, the
court noted that "when the choice of forum is between one in
the United States and one in a foreign country, a United States
citizen's choice of forum in this country is entitled to significant
deference, 'as [the court is] hesitant to deny citizens access to
courts of the United States.' ,45 A New York choice-of-law provi-
sion in the employment contracts of three of the plaintiffs, while
not a forum selection clause, favored showing deference to their
choice of forum.46 And while the flight engineers did not reside
in New York, it was "the place where they began and ended their
work assignments, [and] received their assignments, orders,
equipment, cargo, and other crew members."47 Finally, the de-
fendants did "not show[ ], or even allege[ ], that [the] plaintiffs
[had] any greater connection to Japan than they [did] to New
York."'48
In regard to the second prong, the defendants were amenable
to service of process in Japan, willing to toll any statutes of limi-
tations, and willing to make witnesses available there as well.49
But while Japanese discovery procedures "might be considered
sufficient," on the other hand, "[i]n light of the fact that age
and disability discrimination are not explicitly prohibited by Jap-
anese law, and given the absence of a single Japanese decision
cited that deals with employment discrimination claims," the
court reasoned that "even if Japan [was] an adequate alternative
forum, other factors, including the choice of law provisions,"
spoke in favor of retaining the action.5"
Finally, in applying the third factor, the court found that "the
private and public interests, including the convenience of wit-
nesses and parties, familiarity of the courts with the legal issues,
42 Id. at *6 (quoting Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 416 F.3d 146,
153 (2d Cir. 2005)).
43 Id.
44 Id. at *8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
45 Id. at *10 (quoting Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1335 (11th Cir.
2011)).
46 Id. at *10-11.
47 Id. at *12.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at *15.
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and the impact on the community all favor [ed] litigation in New
York."5
1
In In re Air Crash at Madrid, Spain, on August 20, 2008,52 an
action arising out of the crash of a Spanair McDonnell Douglas
MD-82 jetliner during takeoff in Madrid that killed 154 and in-
jured eighteen, the Central District of California granted defen-
dant airplane manufacturers' motions to dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds.53
More than 200 plaintiffs, who were mostly citizens of Spain,
and none of whom were United States citizens, brought wrong-
ful-death and personal-injury suits, asserting negligence and
strict products liability against the airplane manufacturer, its
successor, and alleged component manufacturers.54
In ruling on the manufacturers' motion to dismiss, the court
noted that the party moving for dismissal on forum non con-
veniens grounds must show (1) "an adequate alternative forum"
and (2) "that the balance of private and public interest factors
favors dismissal. '55 For the first prong, generally, a defendant
can prove an "adequate alternative forum" by demonstrating
that it is "'amenable to process' in anotherjurisdiction" and that
the forum would also provide the plaintiff with a "sufficient rem-
edy for his wrong."' 56 The defendants showed they were amena-
ble to process by agreeing that, as a condition of dismissal, they
would submit themselves to the appropriate Spanish court.57
The plaintiffs argued that, despite the fact that Spanish courts
recognize and allow recovery for negligence and strict-liability
claims, Spain would not provide an "adequate alternative fo-
rum" because (1) their civil claims would be indefinitely delayed
until criminal proceedings against two mechanics involved in
the crash were resolved and (2) the plaintiffs seeking compensa-
tion through the criminal proceedings would not be able to pur-
sue claims against the manufacturing defendants. 58
51 Id. at *21.
52 No. 2:10-ML-02135 GAF, MDL 2135, 2011 WL 1058452 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22,
2011), amended on reconsideration in part, No. 2:10-ML-02135 GAF (RZx), 2011 WL
2183972 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2011).
53 Id. at *1.
54 Id.
55 Id. at *3 (quoting Cariajano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 626 F.3d 1137,
1145 (9th Cir. 2010)).






In response, the court stated, first, that the possible delay did
not make the Spanish courts an inadequate forum, as complex
litigation of this kind could take just as long in the U.S. courts.59
Second, the court stated that the Spanish forum was not inade-
quate simply because it would allow the plaintiffs to be compen-
sated for their losses only once.60 Moreover, the court noted
that if the defendant mechanics were found guilty, the mechan-
ics would likely sue their employer, who would then sue other
joint tortfeasors, thus providing more chances of recovery for
the plaintiffs. 61
In addressing the second requirement-a showing that pri-
vate and public interest factors warrant dismissal-the court
held that defendants must show
facts which either (1) establish such oppressiveness and vexation
to a defendant as to be out of all proportion to [the] plaintiff's
convenience, which may be shown to be slight or nonexistent or
(2) make trial in the chosen forum inappropriate because of con-
siderations affecting the court's own administrative and legal
problems.62
To weigh the private interest factors, the court examined:
(1) the residence of the parties and the witnesses; (2) the fo-
rum's convenience to the litigants; (3) access to physical evi-
dence and other sources of proof; (4) whether unwilling
witnesses [could] be compelled to testify; (5) the cost of bringing
witnesses to trial; (6) the enforceability of the judgment; and (7)
all other practical problems that make the trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive.63
The court concluded that the availability of witnesses and the
cost of witness attendance "slightly favor[ed] dismissal. 64
In analyzing these factors, the court noted that, while one side
would have difficulty in presenting witnesses no matter which
forum would hear the case, the comparative cost for bringing
the witnesses to trial would be greater if the case were tried in
the United States since over 200 plaintiffs were foreign citi-
zens. 65 The court also noted that the alternative forum was
79 id. at *6.
60 Id.
61 Id.
12 Id. at *7 (quoting Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518,
524 (1947)).
63 Id.
64 Id. at *10.
65 Id.
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closer to the plaintiffs, and that, while the plaintiffs argued that
no single Spanish court would have jurisdiction over all the par-
ties that the defendants claimed should be included, such would
also be the case in the United States. 66 Also, while it would be
more "complicated" and costly to translate U.S.-based technical
data into Spanish, it would, by comparison, "lose far more in
translation" the other way.6 7 The "enforceability of the judg-
ment factor" was "neutral," however, since the defendants would
adhere to the judgment in either forum. 68 Next, the court was
not convinced that the plaintiffs faced significant "financial im-
pediments" in the Spanish forum because the plaintiffs might be
liable for the defendants' attorney fees in the Spanish forum
and did not have access to contingency fees in the Spanish fo-
rum as well.69 It reasoned that "[b]ecause the United States
stands almost alone in requiring each side to bear its own attor-
neys' fees, finding the possibility of fee-shifting in a foreign fo-
rum to weigh significantly against dismissal would risk gutting
the doctrine of forum non conveniens entirely. '' 7' However, the
court found the defendants' inability to implead Spanair in the
United States to be a significant factor for dismissal.7'
The court then weighed the public interest factors, which in-
cluded "(1) the local interest in the lawsuit, (2) the court's fa-
miliarity with the governing law, (3) the burden on local courts
and juries, (4) congestion in the court, and (5) the costs of
resolving a dispute unrelated to a particular forum. '7 2 The
court concluded that the local interest was far greater in Spain
than the United States,7" and that if the case were to be tried in
the U.S. courts, it would likely center on interpretations of Span-
ish law.14 Because the local interest in the lawsuit was attenu-
ated in the United States, there was no justification for the
enormous expenditures in time and money of trying the actions
in the United States.75 The court concluded that the suits
should thus be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds.76
66 Id.
67 Id. at *11-12.
68 Id. at *12.
69 Id.
70 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
71 Id. at *14.
72 Id.
73 Id. at *14-15.
74 Id. at *16-17.
75 Id. at *18.
76 Id. at *19.
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In In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic on June 1, 2009, the
Northern District of California concluded for a second time that
the United States was not the proper forum for suits arising out
of the crash of Air France Flight 447 over the Atlantic. 77 The
court had previously dismissed the claims arising out of the acci-
dent on forum non conveniens grounds in 2010.78 The plain-
tiffs re-filed, omitting all French defendants, which in their view
eliminated France as an alternate forum, since French courts
would not have jurisdiction over a lawsuit involving non-French
plaintiffs suing non-French defendants. 79 The defendants,
American aircraft component part manufacturers, moved to dis-
miss the action, and the plaintiffs moved the court to reconsider
its original dismissal.8
The court noted the applicable legal standard in the Ninth
Circuit: "A party moving to dismiss based on forum non con-
veniens bears the burden of showing that (1) there is an ade-
quate alternative forum, and (2) the balance of private and
public interest factors favors dismissal."8 " However, the court's
analysis centered on the rule that "[a] party should not be al-
lowed to assert the unavailability of an alternative forum when
the unavailability is a product of its own purposeful conduct.
8 s2
The court found that this was exactly what the plaintiffs were
doing in "re-filing suits that omit[ted] French [d]efendants they
previously asserted were liable and still seem[ed] to allege
[were] at least partially responsible."8 3 The court expressly
found this conduct, an attempt to defeat forum non conveniens
dismissal, to be "impermissible." 4
The court was not persuaded by the plaintiffs' argument that
they "[were] free to frame their [c]omplaints as they wish[ed]";
that argument "ignore [d] entirely the fact that forum non con-
veniens is by its nature a doctrine that limits plaintiffs'
choices. '85 The plaintiffs could not "render France unavailable
through unilateral jurisdiction defeating pleading," where (1)
the pleadings and "common sense" demonstrated that the
77 792 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1102-03 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
78 See In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic on June 1, 2009, 760 F. Supp. 2d
832, 847-48 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
79 In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
8o Id. at 1093-94.
81 Id. at 1094.
82 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1095.
85 Id. at 1097.
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French parties were proper defendants; (2) the "[p]laintiffs al-
ready sued French parties and dropped them only after a forum
non conveniens dismissal"; and (3) there were no new develop-
ments that "plausibly provid[ed] a reason for why [the]
[p]laintiffs removed the French [d]efendants, other than a de-
sire to defeat the [c]ourt's original forum non conveniens
[o]rder and render France an unavailable forum for the new
actions. '8 6 The court granted the motion to dismiss and denied
the motion for reconsideration. 7
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
A. PREEMPTION UNDER THE FEDERAL AVqATION ACT
Goodspeed Airport LLC v. East Haddam Inland Wetlands & Water-
courses Commission began as a suit filed by a small airport in Con-
necticut seeking declaratory relief against municipal
authorities.88 The relief sought was permission to cut down
trees on the airport property, which included protected wet-
lands.8 9 The airport "[was] not licensed by the [Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA)]; it [was] not federally funded, and
no federal agency ha[d] approved or mandated the removal of
the trees from its property."9 " The airport contended that the
trees qualified as "obstructions to air navigation" under FAA reg-
ulations, and the airport's position was that federal law pre-
empted any need for it to obtain permission from state
authorities under state environmental law to remove the trees.9 1
The federal government formally "disclaimed any authority to
order the trees' removal." 2 After a bench trial, the district
court found that while Congress intended to preempt the field
of air safety, there was no federal interest in what the airport was
proposing to do and hence no preemption, and the court found
in the defendants' favor.9 3
86 Id.
87 Id. As an alternative ground for dismissal, the court examined availability of
the alternative forum anew and reached the same conclusion. See id. at
1097-1103.
88 634 F.3d 206, 208-09 (2d Cir. 2011).
89 Id. at 208.
90 Id. at 211.
91 Id. at 208 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 77.23 (2010)).
92 Id. at 211.
93 Id. at 209.
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On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed.94 The court of ap-
peals declared: "Today we join our sister circuits" in "formally
holding that Congress intended to occupy the field of air
safety. ' 95 Nevertheless, the court determined that, on the facts
of that case, air safety was not sufficiently at issue to trigger that
preemption, since "the generally applicable state laws and regu-
lations imposing permit requirements on land use challenged
[there] [did] not, on the facts before [the court], invade that
preempted field."96 The court also rejected the argument that
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which has an express pre-
emption provision, applied, since "the impact on air carriers of
the laws and regulations at issue [there], if any, [was] too
remote ... .
In re Air Crash Near Clarence Center, New York, on February 12,
2009'8 involved plaintiffs seeking relief in Connecticut, Florida,
New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania for wrongful deaths
arising from the crash of Continental Connection Flight 3407,
which occurred on February 12, 2009, while on final approach
to the Buffalo Niagara International Airport.99 The United
States judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all
pending actions concerning Flight 3407 to the Western District
of New York for pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407.100
"Defendants Pinnacle Airlines Corp. and its wholly owned
subsidiary, Colgan Air, Inc., argue[d] that federal standards of
care appl[ied] to the plaintiffs' state-law negligence claims and
that Virginia law govern[ed] punitive damages." '  The
"[p]laintiffs argue[d] that New York law govern[ed] both the
standards of care and punitive damages."' 0 2
Judge William Skretny abided by the Second Circuit's ruling
that Congress, through the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and its
94 Id. at 212.
95 Id. at 210 (citing U.S. Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1326 (10th
Cir. 2010); Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 2007); Greene
v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 795 (6th Cir. 2005); Abdullah v.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367-68 (3d Cir. 1999); French v. Pan Am Ex-
press, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1989)).
96 Id. at 212.
97 Id.
98 798 F. Supp. 2d 481 (W.D.N.Y. 2011).
99 Id. at 483.
100 Id.
10, Id.
102 Id. at 484.
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associated regulations, intended to preempt state regulations
concerning air safety (including state standards of care)." °3 In
siding with the defendants, Judge Skretny found that applying
state standards of care would interfere with specific safety stan-
dards found in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations and
"potentially subject airlines and related entities to [fifty] differ-
ent standards."'0 4
As for punitive damages, the plaintiffs asserted that New York
law (which has no cap) was controlling while the defendants
maintained that Virginia law (which caps punitive damages at
$350,000) governed.10 5 In weighing the choice-of-law rules of
the states in which the actions were commenced, the court de-
termined that the location of the tort and wrongful conduct
were of critical significance.' 06 Accordingly, the court found "no
cause to depart from New York's general rule of applying lex loci
delicti to choice-of-law questions involving conduct-regulating
laws" (e.g., punitive damages)."0 7 In the court's ultimate view,
"New York's interest 'in the admonitory effect that applying its
law [would] have on similar conduct in the future' [was] of criti-
cal importance and outweigh[ed] Virginia's interest."'0 8
Keum v. Virgin American Inc. arose as the result of an incident
on a Virgin America flight from Seattle to San Francisco on May
27, 2010.""° The plaintiff, Keum, who was sitting in coach class,
attempted to use a lavatory in first class.1 t1 She alleged that a
flight attendant yelled at her for the attempt, standing "so close
while yelling that she could feel his saliva striking her face, forc-
ing her to turn aside.""' He then allegedly punched her shoul-
der, causing numbness. 1 2 Keum, of Korean descent, alleged
103 Id. at 486 (citing Goodspeed Airport LLC v. E. Haddam Inland Wetlands &
Watercourses Comm'n, 634 F.3d 206, 212 (2d Cir. 2011); Aldana v. Air E. Air-
ways, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 2d 489, 493 (D. Conn. 2007)).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 489 (citing Deutsch v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 521,
525 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that for a punitive damages issue, "the law of the
jurisdiction where the conduct occurred should apply")).
107 Id. at 492.
108 Id. (quoting Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684-85
(N.Y. 1985)). The court found that two of the actions were governed by the
Montreal or Warsaw Conventions, neither of which permits recovery of punitive
damages. Id. at 494.






that, by contrast to her treatment, a Caucasian passenger in
coach was allowed to use the first-class toilet without trouble." 3
Keum alleged a number of state-law torts, as well as federal and
state discrimination claims.' 1 4 Virgin America moved for judg-
ment on the pleadings, arguing, among other things, that the
Federal Aviation Act preempted the claims. 15
The court rejected the preemption argument." 6 The court
began its analysis by noting that FAA preemption occurs "in the
fields of economic regulation of airlines and airline safety," and
that the Code of Federal Regulations "clearly establish [es] a fed-
eral standard of care .. .but only as applied to 'aircraft opera-
tors.""' 7 Citing the leading Ninth Circuit cases on preemption,
Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines' " and Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest
Express Holdings,"9 the court found that they "stand for the pro-
position that while the state standard of care is preempted in the
context of claims directly implicating airline safety, state laws
and standards of duty apply to claims directed at matters not
directly touching on airline safety or other fields with pervasive
regulations."''" The court held that Keum's claims, involving al-
leged mistreatment of a passenger by a flight attendant, "[did]
not clearly implicate airline safety" and therefore were not pre-
empted. 12 1 Of the plaintiffs seven causes of action, the court
dismissed three for various infirmities while granting leave to
amend and allowed the other four to stand. 22
Pease v. Lycoming Engines arose from a June 2005 crash of a
Piper aircraft equipped with a Lycoming engine, which the
plaintiffs (the pilot and his wife) alleged was defective." 3 Fol-
lowing Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc.'24 and Elassaad v. Inde-
pendence Air, Inc., 25 the court determined that federal aviation
law and regulations preempted state standards of care in the avi-




116 Id. at 950.
117 Id. at 948-49 (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2010)).
118 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007).
119 555 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2009).
120 Keum, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 950.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 955.
123 No. 4:10-CV-00843, 2011 WL 6339833, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2011).
124 181 F.3d 363, 368-69 (3d Cir. 1999).
125 613 F.3d 119, 127 (3d Cir. 2010).
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islative history of the Aviation Act, and held that any
independent state regulation would undermine [c] ongressional
intent to create a 'single, uniform system of regulation.' . . . Fed-
eral standards of care app l[ied] to the Peases' state law
claims."' 2 a The court noted that other district courts in the
Third Circuit had rejected the argument that federal preemp-
tion "is not applicable to the entire field of aviation safety and
therefore their state law claims [were] not precluded."'27
Nevertheless, the court went on to decide that the plaintiffs
were "not foreclosed from litigating claims relating to the air-
worthiness of the AH1A engine," rejecting Lycoming's reliance
on the issuance of a type certificate as an absolute defense. 2 '
The plaintiffs alleged specific violations of numerous civil air
regulations and federal air regulations.129 The court granted
summary judgment to Lycoming on some of these alleged
breaches, but not on all. 3 '
The court also denied Lycoming's motion for summary judg-
ment on a claim under the Tennessee Products Liability Act of
1978 (the location of the crash was in Tennessee, and the court
had earlier determined that Tennessee law applied).' Given
the issuance of a type certificate, however, the court did allow
Lycoming the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that the en-
gine was not unreasonably dangerous.132
The court ended its opinion with an unusual "epilogue" in
which it lamented "the inscrutability and limitations of Abdul-
lah's ratio decidendi as applied to aviation products liability
cases."13 3 Acknowledging the "tension" in allowing products lia-
bility suits to proceed against manufacturers who have a valid
FAA type certificate, the court "strongly urge[d] the Third Cir-
126 Pease, 2011 WL 6339833, at *12.
127 Id. at *11 (citing Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 731 F. Supp. 2d 429,
432-40 (M.D. Pa. 2010); Landis v. US Airways, Inc., No. 07-1216, 2008 WL
728369, at *2, *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2008); Duvall v. Avco Corp., No. 4:CV
05-1786, 2006 WL 1410794, at *2-3 (M.D. Pa. May 19, 2006)).
128 Id. at *14.
129 Id. at *15-17.
130 Id.; see Pease v. Lycoming Engines, No. 4:10-CV-00843, 2011 WL 3667562, at
*7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2011) (an earlier decision in which the court denied
Lycoming's motion to dismiss the amended complaint because the plaintiffs had
cited specific federal standards of care).
131 Pease, 2011 WL 6339833, at *23.
132 Id. at *17.
133 Id. at *21.
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cuit to clarify Abdullah's application to aviation products liability
cases or to limit Abdullah to its facts."'134
B. PREEMPTION UNDER THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF
1978 (ADA).3 5
In In re Korean Air Lines Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the ADA applies to foreign and domestic air car-
riers equally, and therefore state-law claims regarding airfare
prices that were asserted against foreign airlines were pre-
empted."3 6 The plaintiffs brought a putative class action (one of
several against the defendants) based on state and federal anti-
trust and consumer protection laws, asserting that Korean Air
Lines and Asiana Airlines conspired to impose illegal surcharges
on airfares." 7 The district court dismissed the state-law claims
based on ADA preemption, and the court of appeals affirmed
(the court of appeals reversed the district court's refusal to allow
the plaintiffs to reinstate their federal-law claims after they had
earlier been voluntarily dismissed).'
The ADA provides that a "[s] tate... may not enact or enforce
a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect
of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier
.... -y The plaintiffs argued that "Congress [had] statutorily
defined 'air carrier' and 'foreign air carrier' as mutually exclu-
sive terms," and thus the ADA's provisions regarding "air carri-
ers" did not apply to "foreign air carriers."14° Second, they
argued that their state-law claims regarding the airfare
surcharges were "not 'related' to the price of an air carrier and
therefore [were] not preempted."'' The court rejected both
contentions.'42
In rejecting the first contention, the Ninth Circuit held that
an "examination of the [Federal Aviation Act] shows that Con-
gress's use of the term 'air carrier' throughout the Act does not
always correspond with that term's statutory definition and that
'air carrier' is sometimes used to refer generally to both domes-
134 Id. at *23.
135 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2006).
136 642 F.3d 685, 696 (9th Cir. 2011).
137 Id. at 689.
138 Id.
139 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
140 In re Korean Air Lines Co., 642 F.3d at 691.
'41 Id. at 691-92.
142 Id.
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tic and foreign airlines."'43 Because of the inconsistency, the
term "air carrier" standing alone was "necessarily ambiguous,"
and therefore each statutory section in which the term appeared
had to be analyzed for context. 144 The contextual reading of
these sections revealed that "Congress intended that it apply to
all air carriers and not only to domestic carriers."'45 In addition,
the court of appeals held that its finding was reinforced by (1) a
review of the ADA's purpose and legislative history;'46 (2) a re-
view of case law where, although the issue was not explicitly dis-
cussed, courts (including the Supreme Court) applied ADA
preemption of state-law claims to foreign airlines "without reser-
vation";147 (3) a "pragmatic concern" that, should preemption
not apply, foreign air carriers would face burdens that domestic
carriers do not, thus undermining the nation's "general prefer-
ence for free trade" and also injuring consumers because for-
eign carriers would be less likely to enter the U.S. market;14 and
(4) a concern that the plaintiffs' approach discriminated against
foreign carriers in contravention of U.S. "treaty obligations man-
dating nondiscrimination." 149
In rejecting the plaintiffs' second contention, that their state-
law claims did not "relate [ ] to a price" of an air carrier for pur-
poses of ADA preemption, the court of appeals noted that the
gravamen of the complaint was price-fixing, and therefore the
"claims [were] plainly related to a price of an air carrier and
consequently [were] preempted. ' 150 The court also rejected the
plaintiffs' arguments on preemption regarding the alleged con-
sistency of state laws with the purpose of the federal statute.15 1
The court looked to the 2008 U.S. Supreme Court case of Rowe
v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass'n,1 52 which held that, for
purposes of a preemption analysis, "it makes no difference
whether a state law is 'consistent' or 'inconsistent' with federal
143 Id. at 692.
144 Id. at 692-93 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 343-44
(1997)).
145 Id. at 693.
146 Id. at 693-95.
147 Id. at 695-96.
148 Id. at 696.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 696-97.
151 Id. at 697.
152 552 U.S. 364 (2008).
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regulation.' ' 53 Finally, the court relied on Rowe to reject the
plaintiffs' argument that the Supreme Court's cabining of the
term "'relate to' in the ERISA preemption provision" showed an
intent "to limit the ADA's preemption provision" as well.1 54 In
Rowe, the U.S. Supreme Court looked to the ADA's preemption
provision to analyze the identical provision in the FAA Authori-
zation Act. 55 The court of appeals held that "[i]f the Supreme
Court intended to narrow the scope of these preemption provi-
sions because of its ERISA decisions, it could have done so in
Rowe, but it did not," and therefore the ERISA analysis was
unavailing.15
6
On the other hand, in Giannopoulos v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de
Espana, S.A., the Northern District of Illinois found that the
ADA did not preempt claims for compensation arising out of a
delayed flight. 157 The plaintiffs, who arrived in Athens twenty-
four hours behind schedule when their Iberia flight from Chi-
cago was delayed, "filed [a] putative class action . . . alleging
breach of contract based on Iberia's failure to pay compensation
for [the plaintiffs'] delayed flight as required by Iberia's contrac-
tual conditions and Regulation No. 261/2004 of the European
Parliament and European Council (EU 261). '158 According to
EU 261, "passengers on qualifying flights that are cancelled are
entitled to a set amount of compensation so long as the cancel-
lation was not caused by unavoidable extraordinary
circumstances." 5
9
The court noted the Supreme Court's carve-out of an excep-
tion to ADA preemption for breach-of-contract claims.6 0 Ac-
cording to American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,'6' "the ADA does not
'shelter airlines from suits alleging no violation of state-imposed
obligations, but seeking recovery solely for the airline's alleged
breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings. '162 The court ac-
cepted the plaintiffs' argument that Iberia "voluntarily agreed to
abide by EU 261 by incorporating it into the conditions of con-





157 No. 11 C 775, 2011 WL 3166159, at *2-3 (N.D. I1. July 27, 2011).
158 Id. at *1.
159 Id.
160 Id. at *2.
161 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
162 Giannopoulos, 2011 WL 3166159, at *2 (quoting Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228).
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tract. '  While EU 261 does not explicitly provide for compen-
sating passengers whose flights have been delayed, the district
court noted that the European Court ofJustice (ECJ) has inter-
preted EU 261 in this manner'64 and therefore deemed the
ECJ's interpretation as binding. 1 65 "Thus, Iberia's agreement to
pay compensation according to EU 261 must be read as an
agreement to abide by EU 261, as interpreted by the ECJ."' 66
The court also addressed Iberia's argument that the Montreal
Convention was preemptive, finding that "[e]ffectively, then,
the Montreal Convention operates as a limitation on recovery
not as a bar to a state law action." '67 While the court noted that
EU 261's "standardized compensation" appeared that it might
violate Article 29 of the Montreal Convention (which prohibits
"non-compensatory damages"), the court declined to rule that
the plaintiffs' claims were precluded by the Montreal Conven-
tion in the absence of further briefing on the issue.' 8 The
court was also not persuaded by Iberia's arguments that the
plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed based on the Air Trans-
port Agreement between the United States and the European
Union,'69 the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust available remedies in
the EU, 7 ° or principles of international comity. 7 '
DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc. resulted from a lawsuit
brought by skycaps at Boston's Logan Airport, who were upset
by a new mandatory two-dollar-per-bag fee to check bags curb-
side, which went to the airlines, not the skycaps. 72 The plain-
tiffs alleged that this fee, which was posted on signs at the
terminal, resulted in lower tip income for them and, among
other claims, violated a Massachusetts statute on tips.'73 The
statute provides that "[n]o employer or other person shall de-
mand . .. or accept from any . . .service employee . . . any
payment or deduction from a tip or service charge given to such
... service employee.. . by a patron."'17 4 As the court of appeals
163 Id. at *3.
164 See id. at *1.
165 Id. at *3.
166 Id.
167 Id. at *4.
168 Id. at *5.
169 Id.
170 Id. at *6.
"21 Id. at *7.
172 646 F.3d 81, 82 (1st Cir. 2011).
173 Id. at 84 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 152A (2008)).
174 Id. (quoting ch. 149, § 152A(b) (alteration in original)).
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put it, "[t]he gravamen of the tips law claim [was] that the [two-
dollar] fee [was] a 'service charge' under state law (and must
therefore [have gone] to the skycaps) because customers 'rea-
sonably expect[ed]' it to be given to the skycaps." 1 5
American moved for summary judgment on the tips law
claim, citing the ADA's express preemption provision that pro-
rides that no state may "enact or enforce a law, regulation, or
other provision having the force and effect of law related to a
price, route, or service of an air carrier."' 76 The district court
denied that motion, and the claim was tried before a jury in
early 2008.'7 The jury found for the plaintiffs on the tips law
claim and awarded damages and attorney fees. 7 8 American
appealed. 179
The court of appeals began by noting the three leading Su-
preme Court decisions on the preemptive effect of the ADA: s0
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,' American Airlines, Inc. v.
Wolens, 182 and Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass'n."13
Those cases
read the preemption language broadly, and none adopted [the]
plaintiffs' position in [the case before the court] that [the court]
should presume strongly against preempting in areas historically
occupied by state law .... However traditional the area, a state
law may simultaneously interfere with an express federal policy-
[there], one limiting regulation of airlines.184
While the court took the "view that the Supreme Court would be
unlikely-with some possible qualifications-to free airlines
from most conventional common law claims for tort, from pre-
vailing wage laws, and ordinary taxes applicable to other busi-
nesses," it concluded that applying the state tips law in these
circumstances would expose American to requirements on "ad-
vertising and service arrangements [that] are just what Congress
did not want states regulating," like modification of sign font
175 Id.
176 Id. (quoting Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)
(2006)).
177 Id.
178 Id. at 84-85.
179 Id. at 85.
180 Id. at 86.
is, 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
182 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
18- 552 U.S. 364 (2008).
184 DiFiore, 646 F.3d at 86 (citations omitted).
2012] 295
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
and placement, permitting credit-card payments, and the like.' 85
In light of the preemption, the court of appeals reversed the
judgment below and remanded for entry of judgment in Ameri-
can's favor.'86
Spinrad v. Comair, Inc. denied summary judgment to the air-
line defendant on a negligence claim?87 The plaintiff was in-
jured stepping off an aircraft operated by the defendant while
the plane made an unscheduled stop at Norfolk airport. 8 The
flight was scheduled to go from New York to Florida, but was
forced to land in Norfolk because a passenger became ill en
route.1 8 9 The district court determined that the state-law negli-
gence claim was not preempted because the plaintiff was not
alleging any defective design in the airstairs that she used to step
off the plane, but merely negligent conduct on the part of the
airline's employees who should have been helping her, warning
her, or using different means to get her off the aircraft.1 90 As a
result, it was "not a case that [fell] within the field of air safety.
It concern[ed] a defendant's conduct aboard a non-airborne
plane, and [the] plaintiff's claim [did] not depend on a theory
of defective design."'' The court likewise held that the ADA
did not preempt the plaintiffs claim, either, "[b]ecause of the
de minimis effect [the] plaintiff[']s claim [was] likely to have on
[the] defendant's rates, routes, or services." 192 The court found
a negligence claim unsuited to summary judgment and denied
the motion."'
Similarly, in Jimenez Ruiz v. Spirit Airlines, the District of Puerto
Rico ruled that the ADA did not preempt the territory's general
negligence law when applied to a plaintiff who was injured dur-
ing a fall when exiting an aircraft.' In Jimenez, the plaintiff
slipped and fell while exiting a plane in Puerto Rico. 195 The
plaintiff brought suit based upon the general law of negligence
in that territory, claiming that the airline was negligent in failing
1s5 Id. at 87-88.
186 Id. at 90.
187 825 F. Supp. 2d 397, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
is" Id. at 401.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 410-11.
191 Id. at 411.
192 Id. at 414.
193 Id.
194 794 F. Supp. 2d 344, 344 (D.P.R. 2011).
19- Id. at 345.
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to provide a safe method of disembarkment.19 6 The defendant
airline claimed that the ADA, which governs the provision of
services to air passengers and covers the rates and services pro-
vided by airlines to their customers, preempted the general law
of negligence.197 However, the court in that case ruled that the
act of disembarking the plane "affect[ed] airline services in a
too tenuous, remote, or peripheral manner."198 Disembarking
the plane was not a service provided to the passengers, but in-
stead was simply a routine act and thus subject to general negli-
gence law.' 9 Therefore, the plaintiff's case was allowed to
proceed.2 °°
Aretakis v. Federal Express Corp. was a pro se lawsuit brought by a
disappointed shipper of a package via Federal Express
(FedEx) .21 Although the shipper approved leaving the package
without requiring a signature, FedEx elected not to do so on its
first delivery attempt, and the package ultimately reached its re-
cipient three days later. 20 2 The plaintiff sued in state court for
negligence, breach of contract, and violation of a New York con-
sumer protection statute.20 3  FedEx removed the case and
moved for summary judgment largely on grounds of preemp-
tion under the ADA, which the magistrate judge recommended
for most of the claims. 20 4
Following the Second Circuit's instruction that the ADA "be
applied on a case-by-case basis," the court determined that the
state deceptive business practices count and the negligence
count were preempted since "permitting the plaintiff to prose-
cute his negligence cause of action implicate[d], and [had] a
direct effect on, FedEx's package transportation and delivery
services. "205 While the breach-of-contract count was not pre-
empted, the airbill limited liability to the lesser of $100 or actual
196 Id.
197 Id. at 346.
198 Id. at 349 (internal quotation marks omitted).
',9 Id. at 348.
200 Id. at 349.




204 Id. at *1-2.
205 Id. at *3-4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2972012]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AAD COMMERCE
damages. 2"6 The district court adopted the magistrate judge's
recommendation.20 7
In Ginsberg v. Northwest, Inc., a passenger who had reached
platinum elite status in Northwest's frequent flier program sued
after his status was rescinded by the airline. 20 8 The plaintiff sued
on the basis of state common-law contract claims, alleging a lack
of good faith and fair dealing on the part of the airline for tak-
ing away his status improperly.20 9
After examining the history of the preemption precedent in
the Ninth Circuit, the court of appeals held that the ADA was
not meant to preempt common-law contract claims of the type
alleged by the plaintiff.21  While the ADA allowed airlines to
compete over pricing and services, it did not state that all con-
tractual claims against airlines are preempted by the law.2 1' The
court rejected the argument that the ADA preempted all state-
law contract claims regarding airlines. 21 2 The court also re-
jected the argument that a frequent flier program was a "ser-
vice" or that it related to pricing such that all claims
surrounding it were preempted.2 13 The court emphasized that
"services" and pricing do not include ancillary services, such as
serving drinks, and put the frequent flier program in the ancil-
lary category: "A claim for breach of good faith and fair dealing
does not relate to 'services' because it has nothing to do with
schedules, origins, destinations, cargo, or mail. '214 Ultimately,
the frequent flier program operated on the periphery of the air-
line's business and was too tenuously connected to the business
of serving passengers to preempt the plaintiffs claims.215
In Schultz v. United Airlines, the court ruled that the ADA pre-
empted the plaintiff's claims alleging (1) that the payment of a
checked-bag fee created a contractual obligation on the part of
the airline and (2) that a twenty-four-hour delay in delivery by
the airline constituted a variety of breach-of-contract claims, in-
cluding breach of the duty to covenant in good faith and unjust
206 Id. at *6.
207 SeeAretakis v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 10 Civ. 1696(JSR), 2011 WL 1197596,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2011).
208 653 F.3d 1033, 1033 (9th Cir. 2011).
209 Id. at 1035.
210 Id. at 1037-41.
211 Id. at 1034-35.
212 Id. at 1040-42.
213 Id. at 1041-42.
214 Id. at 1042.
215 Id. at 1037, 1042.
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enrichment. 216 The court found that the transportation of bag-
gage was done pursuant to a "condition[ ] of carriage," as
promulgated by the airlines and that that "condition[ ] of car-
riage," as created by each airline and provided to each con-
sumer, was governed by the ADA. 17
The plaintiffs claim that the airline created a "self-imposed"
obligation to which the ADA did not apply, by charging a fee for
checked baggage, was found to be without merit.21 The choices
as to whether to charge a bag fee and how much to charge were
within the realm of competing services as covered by the ADA,
and any attempt to impose additional requirements on checked-
bag transportation was preempted. 19
A similar issue was raised in Hickcox-Huffman v. US Airzways.2 20
In that case, the plaintiff attempted to bring a class-action suit
against US Airways on behalf of a group of passengers who paid
a fifteen-dollar baggage fee to the airline and whose luggage was
subsequently lost or delayed. 221 The plaintiff argued that the
baggage fee served as a contract that the luggage would be deliv-
ered safely and on time, and that the airline should be required
to return the baggage fee when the luggage is lost or delayed.222
The court dismissed the plaintiffs proposed class, ruling that
the assessment of baggage fees was an area in which the airlines
were clearly competing, and that the ADA intended for them to
compete without interference: "It is obvious that baggage fees
are just one of many fronts on which airlines are doing competi-
tive battle. . . . [the] [p]laintiff's claims would impermissibly
'frustrate the goals of economic deregulation by interfering with
the forces of competition.' ,223 The court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that, by adding a baggage fee, the airlines had not
involved themselves in a "self-imposed undertaking. ' 2 4 The
court ruled that, because there was no contractual obligation
imposed upon US Airways by the baggage fee, there was no self-
imposed obligation to return the baggage fees.22 5 Thus, the
216 797 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1104 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
217 Id. at 1106.
218 Id. at 1106-07.
219 Id.
220 788 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
22! Id. at 1037-38.
222 Id. at 1038.
223 Id. at 1041 (quoting Charas v. TWA, 160 F.3d 1259, 1263 (9th Cir. 1998)).
224 Id. at 1042.
225 Id. ar 1042-43.
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plaintiffs potential claims were preempted by the ADA, and the
proposed class was struck down.226
In Restivo v. Continental Airlines, Inc., the appellate court af-
firmed the dismissal of a purported class-action suit against Con-
tinental that challenged Continental's one-year expiration date
on gift cards.22 17 The suit was brought under Ohio consumer
protection law, the Gift Card Statute, and for unjust enrich-
ment.228 The trial court determined that the ADA preempted
the state statutory claims, and that the unjust-enrichment claim
failed as well in light of an express contract.229 The appellate
court affirmed.2 30
The court noted that the ADA explicitly provides that "a
[s] tate ... may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other
provision having the force and effect of law related to a price,
route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transporta-
tion under this subpart. ' 23 1 While the plaintiffs argued that the
gift cards were merely a cash equivalent, the court agreed with
Continental that the cards should be considered as relating to
the service of an air carrier and therefore preempted under the
ADA:
It is not simply a financial transaction, as appellants argue, be-
cause its value derives from the intended purpose of securing
goods or services from Continental in the future. Stated differ-
ently, the gift cards were purchased in lieu of an immediate, di-
rect purchase of airline tickets. If appellants had directly
purchased airline tickets, there would be no dispute that the tick-
ets related to the airline's service. The fact that the gift card
postpones the eventual purchase of an airline ticket does not al-
ter the fact that the gift card is still related to the provision of air
232transportation. -
Finally, since the complaint itself alleged the existence of an ex-
press contract related to the gift cards, no claim for unjust en-
richment could be maintained.2 33
226 Id.
227 947 N.E.2d 1287, 1287-88 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011).
228 Id. at 1288.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 1291.
231 Jd. at 1289 (quoting Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.
§ 41713(b) (1) (2006)).
232 Id. at 1290.
233 Id. at 1291.
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In ATA Airlines, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp.,2 34 the Seventh Cir-
cuit determined that the district court incorrectly ruled that a
promissory-estoppel claim was preempted by the ADA, although
it ultimately concluded that the claim (along with a breach-of-
contract claim) failed for the independent reason that the al-
leged contract was fatally indeterminate.2 5 The suit arose out of
a relationship between ATA and FedEx in the context of the
Department of Defense's so-called "Civil Reserve Air Fleet,"
which provides extra airlifting capacity for defense needs.2 6
FedEx was the "team leader" in charge of submitting a bid to the
Department of Defense, one made up of commitments from the
smaller carriers that made up the "team" (several teams of air-
lines would compete for bids) .237 ATA was one of the smaller
carriers on FedEx's team.238
In 2008, FedEx dropped ATA from the team, and ATA sued
for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. 239 The alleged
contract was in the form of a 2006 letter from FedEx to ATA.24 °
While the district court held that ATA's promissory-estoppel
claim was preempted by the ADA, it allowed the breach-of-con-
tract claim to proceed to a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict
for ATA.241 FedEx appealed.242
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, reversed
the district court's ruling on preemption because "[p]romissory
estoppel, as the word 'promissory' implies, furnishes a ground
for enforcing a promise made by a private party, rather than for
implementing a state's regulatory policies. ' 243 There was, there-
fore, no basis to enforce the ADA's preemption clause because a
state may not "enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provi-
sion having the force and effect of law related to a price, route,
or service of an air carrier. "244
234 665 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 2011).
235 Id. at 884.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 883.
239 Id. at 883-84.
240 Id. at 886.
241 Id. at 883.
242 1d.
243 Id. at 884.
244 Id. (quoting Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)
(2006)).
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Ultimately, however, that did not result in a win for ATA,
since the court found that the FedEx letter was too indefinite to
be enforced by a court:
Even if we assumed-unrealistically-that all the other holes that
we mentioned in the team structure for 2007-2009 could be fil-
led by a court from industry standards, course of dealing, trade
usage, or some other objective source of guidance that enables
judicial completion of an incomplete contract, the price term-
FedEx's compensation for providing team leadership and trans-
ferring mobilization value points to team members-could not
be supplied from any such source.24 5
And so the court reversed the judgment and instructed the dis-
trict court to dismiss the suit with prejudice.246
Judge Posner concluded by chastising ATA's reliance on
shoddy regression analysis and the district court's decision to
allow such evidence to be presented at trial.247 He not only ex-
plained why the expert's analysis was "fatally flawed," but also
observed that "neither party's lawyers, judging from the trial
transcript and the transcript of the Rule 702 hearing and the
briefs and oral argument in [that] court, underst[ood] regres-
sion analysis; or if they [did] understand it they [were] unable
to communicate their understanding in plain English. '248 This
was reason alone to exclude such evidence: "If a party's lawyer
cannot understand the testimony of the party's own expert, the
testimony should be withheld from the jury. Evidence unintel-
ligible to the trier or triers of fact has no place in a trial. 249
C. PREEMPTION UNDER THE GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
In Getz v. Boeing Co., which arose from the February 2007
crash of an Army Chinook helicopter in Afghanistan, the Ninth
Circuit determined that a British defendant was properly dis-
missed for lack of personal jurisdiction, and that the plaintiffs'
claims against U.S. defendant contractors were preempted by
the government contractor defense.25 °
The helicopter crashed after it encountered ice, rain, and
snow on the way to Bagram Airbase, causing one of its engines
245 Id. at 887.
246 Id. at 896.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 889.
249 Id. at 896.
250 654 F.3d 852, 857-60 (9th Cir. 2011).
302
RE CENT DEVELOPMENTS
to unexpectedly shut down, killing eight and severely injuring
fourteen. 25 An initial Army investigation determined that the
helicopter's engine control system (FADEC) unexpectedly shut
down, and the engine control system's onboard computer
(DECU) malfunctioned "due to some kind of electrical anom-
aly."'2 52 A second investigation, conducted by the manufacturers
of the Chinook, posited that the engine experienced a water-
induced flameout in the harsh weather, and that the flameout
might have been avoided if the Chinook's engines had a contin-
uous relight feature that would have allowed the engines to
restart automatically.2 53
The plaintiffs, the injured servicemen and the heirs of the de-
ceased, brought suit in California state court alleging state-law
causes of action for products liability, negligence, wrongful
death, and loss of consortium against Boeing (which designed
the Chinook's airframe), Honeywell (which designed and built
the engines), Goodrich Pump and Engine Control (which de-
signed the FADEC), and the British company AT Engine Con-
trols (ATEC) (which designed hardware and software for the
DECU). 254 Boeing removed the case to federal court based on
the Federal Officer Removal Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a).255
The district court dismissed ATEC and granted summary judg-
ment to Boeing, Honeywell, and Goodrich (collectively, the U.S.
contractors) 256
In first affirming the dismissal of ATEC for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit's discussion centered on Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k) (2), the federal long-arm statute,
which "permits federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction
over a defendant that lacks contacts with any single state if the
complaint alleges federal claims and the defendant maintains
sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole. '2 57 The
only question before the court was whether the plaintiffs satis-
fied the first few words of Rule 4(k) (2) that refer to "a claim that
arises under federal law."'25 In other words, did "any of [plain-
tiffs'] claims against ATEC-pure state-law claims for product
251 id. at 857.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 857-58.




258 Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2)).
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liability, negligence, wrongful death, and loss of consortium-
arise under federal law? '259 The plaintiffs argued that their
claims arose under federal law because of the defendants' re-
moval pursuant to the Federal Officer Removal Statute; once
the defendants asserted a federal defense in their removal peti-
tion, the plaintiffs argued their own claims became "substan-
tively federal. ' 260 The court of appeals rejected this argument,
noting the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. Manypenny,261
where the Supreme Court explained that "the invocation of re-
moval jurisdiction by a federal officer does not revise or alter the
underlying law to be applied."262 Thus, the Ninth Circuit found,
"[t] he existence of a federal defense does not transform purely
state-law claims into 'federally created cause[s] of action.' "263
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the dis-
trict court should have allowed jurisdictional discovery to deter-
mine whether ATEC had minimum contacts with California.264
The court found that the plaintiffs had not asserted "any specific
facts, transactions, or conduct that would give rise to personal
jurisdiction over ATEC in California. '265 Because an inquiry
into ATEC's minimum contacts would be founded on "purely
speculative allegations," the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in denying the plaintiffs' request for discovery on this
point.266
The court then addressed the government contractor de-
fense.267 "Th[e] defense protects government contractors from
tort liability that arises as a result of the contractor's compliance
with the specifications of a federal . . . contract. "268 The Su-
preme Court's decision in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.269
provides the three elements that must be established for the de-
fense to be found: "(1) the United States approved reasonably
precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those
specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States
259 Id.
260 Id. at 859-60.
261 451 U.S. 232 (1981).






268 Id. (citation omitted).
269 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
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about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known
to the supplier but not to the United States. "270
The focal point of the plaintiffs' claims was that the Chinook's
ignition system was defective because it lacked the continuous
relight function; also defective were the FADEC, the DECU, and
the helicopter itself.27 1 The Ninth Circuit measured each of
these allegations against Boyle's framework and found that the
U.S. contractors established all three elements of the govern-
ment contractor defense.2 7 2
First, the court observed that Honeywell provided the Army
with complete engine specifications. 273 The court noted that
Honeywell's specifications explicitly stated that the continuous
relight function would not be provided, and thus "Honeywell's
specifications describe [d], in reasonable detail, the design fea-
ture alleged to be defective. ' 274 The court further noted that
the Army's approval of the designs resulted from "careful delib-
eration, not a rubber stamp. "275 The court repeated this analysis
with regard to the FADEC-DECU and found that the "Army also
approved reasonably precise specifications for [their] de-
sign .... ",276 and that the "Army carefully scrutinized, tested, and
made necessary changes to the FADEC-DECU. ' '277 The court re-
jected the plaintiffs' contention that the aircraft as a whole was
defective, based on the court's analysis regarding the ignition
system and FADEC-DECU.278
The court then turned to the second element of the govern-
ment contractor defense: conformity with government-approved
specifications. 279 The court followed decisions from other cir-
cuits and held that "absent some evidence of a latent manufac-
turing defect, a military contractor can establish conformity with
reasonably precise specifications by showing '[e]xtensive gov-
ernment involvement in the design, review, development and
testing of a product' and by demonstrating 'extensive accept-
270 Getz, 654 F.3d at 861 (quoting Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512).
271 Id.
272 Id. at 861-65.
273 Id. at 861.
274 Id.
275 Id. (citation omitted).
276 Id. at 862.
277 Id. at 863.
278 Id. at 863-64.
279 id. at 864.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ance and use of the product following production.' ',280 The
court found just that in the case before it: "Because [the]
[p]laintiffs [did] not present any evidence of a latent manufac-
turing defect that was undiscovered at the time of acceptance,
the government's careful scrutiny and subsequent certification
of the MH-47E provide[d] sufficient proof of conformity.""28  It
made no difference that the "engine obviously did not perform
like it was supposed to."' 28 2 Otherwise, the court reasoned, fol-
lowing precedent from other circuits, the defense would have
no substance since no government-approved specifications
"would purposefully allow a design that would result in an acci-
dent. '"2 83 Boyle's test for conformity was satisfied by "undisputed
evidence that the ignition system and the DECU conformed
with the reasonably precise design specifications approved by
the Army. 284
In finding that the U.S. contractors satisfied the last element
of the defense, the court noted that "a government contractor is
only responsible for warning the government of dangers about
which it has actual knowledge, '"285 and that Boyle "does not re-
quire a contractor to warn about dangers of which it merely
should have known '286 or that a contractor "warn of dangers
that were already known to the United States. 2 87
Finally, the Ninth Circuit separately examined the plaintiffs'
state-law failure-to-warn claims.288
[A] contractor cannot defeat a failure-to-warn claim simply by es-
tablishing the elements of the Boyle defense as it applies to de-
sign-defect and manufacturing-defect claims. Rather, the
contractor must show that it "act[ed] in compliance with 'reason-
ably precise specifications' imposed on it by the United States" in
deciding "whether to provide a warning. "289
280 Id. (quoting Kerstetter v. Pac. Scientific Co., 210 F.3d 431, 435-36 (5th Cir.
2000)).
281 Id.
282 Id. at 865.
283 Id. (quoting Kleemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890 F.2d 698, 703 (4th
Cir. 1989)).
284 Id.
285 Id. (quoting Kerstetter, 210 F.3d at 436).
286 Id. at 866.
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 Id. (citation omitted).
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The court found this element satisfied based on the Army's de-
termination of which warnings were to be provided in the opera-
tor's manual.290
D. PREEMPTION UNDER THE DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT
In Helman v. Alcoa Global Fastener, Inc.,291 the Ninth Circuit de-
termined that the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) 29 2 ap-
plied in the area between three and twelve nautical miles from
the shore of the United States and thus preempted state-law
claims brought by the personal representatives of three U.S.
Navy crewmen killed in a helicopter crash nine and one-half
nautical miles off the coast of Catalina Island, California.293 Spe-
cifically, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
determination
that DOHSA applies to noncommercial aircraft accidents beyond
three nautical miles from shore, and that Presidential Proclama-
tion No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988) ("Proclamation
5298"), which extended the territorial sea of the United States
from three to twelve nautical miles from shore, did nothing to
alter DOHSA's applicability. 29 4
In reaching its finding, the district court relied on then-Judge
Sonia Sotomayor's dissent in In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New
York, on July 17, 1996 (TWA Flight 800 Case) 295
The issue before the Ninth Circuit was the definition of the
term "high seas" as it is used in DOHSA, which applies "[w]hen
the death of an individual is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or
default occurring on the high seas beyond [three] nautical
miles from the shore of the United States. ' 295 The Second Cir-
cuit in the TWA Flight 800 Case determined "that 'high seas' as
used in DOHSA refers to ... international waters and that Proc-
lamation 5928, by extending U.S. territorial waters from three to
twelve nautical miles from shore, effectively changed the inner-
290 Id. at 866-67.
2 91 637 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2011).
292 Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30301-08 (2006).
293 Helman, 637 F.3d at 987-88.
294 Id. at 988-89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
295 Id. at 989-90 (citing In re Air Crash Off Long Island, N.Y., on July 17, 1996,
209 F.3d 200, 215 (2d Cir. 2000)).
296 Id. at 989 (quoting Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2006)).
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boundary of DOHSA's applicability to twelve nautical miles from
shore. "297
The Ninth Circuit found instead that "[a] plain reading of the
statutory text" led to the conclusion that "there is no indication
that [the term 'high seas'] was meant to incorporate into the
statute the independent and fluid political concept of U.S. terri-
torial waters. ' 298 Rather, "the term 'high seas' is defined for pur-
poses of the statute by the explicitly stated geographic boundary
of 'beyond three nautical miles' from shore. 299
The court found support for its conclusion in recent congres-
sional amendments to DOHSA.3 ° In 2006, the phrase "beyond
a marine league" in DOHSA's text was replaced by "beyond
three nautical miles. "301 "Notably, then, Congress reinforced
the geographic boundary specified within DOHSA's text even
after Proclamation 5928's extension of the U.S. territorial waters
to twelve nautical miles from shore. 30 2 Had Congress intended
to change DOHSA applicability, the court concluded, it would
have done so.' °3 In 2000, Congress amended DOHSA so that it
would "not apply if the death resulted from a commercial avia-
tion accident occurring on the high seas [twelve] nautical miles
or less from the shore of the United States. '3 " The amend-
ment, the court reasoned, could only mean that "a portion of
the 'high seas' as used in DOHSA lies within twelve nautical
miles from shore.3 0 5 Otherwise, the language of the amend-
ment would be "nonsensical."3"6 The court "acknowledged" the
Second Circuit's opposite conclusion in the TWA Fight 800 Case,
but also pointed out that that decision came down before the
2000 and 2006 amendments to DOHSA, which aided the Ninth
Circuit in reaching its holding.307
Lastly, the court noted further reasons, above and beyond the
plain reading of the statute, that supported its holding that
Proclamation 5928 did not change the geographical boundaries
297 Id. at 989-90 (citing In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 209 F.3d at 202, 205,
215).
298 Id. at 990.
299 Id. at 990-91.




304 Id. (citing Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30307(c) (2006)).
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Id. at 992.
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of DOHSA.3 °8 "First .... Proclamation [5928] explicitly state [d]
that it [did] not 'extend or ... alter existing [f]ederal or [s]tate
law or any jurisdiction, rights, legal interests, or obligations de-
rived therefrom."' 30 9 Second, while Congress chose to amend
certain maritime statutes in response to Proclamation 5928,
DOHSA was not among them."'0 Third, while the President has
"the authority to extend or contract the territorial sea pursuant
to his constitutionally delegated power over foreign relations,"
the "power to create and alter the scope of federally-created
remedies for victims of wrongful acts, however, remains squarely
within Congress. '31' "[N]othing in the record [before the
court] suggest[ed] that Congress intended to delegate to the
executive branch the power to determine the scope of
DOHSA.... 3 12
E. PREEMPTION UNDER 49 U.S.C. § 44112 (AIRCRAFT
LESSOR LMILITVY)
In Vreeland v. Ferrer,313 the Florida Supreme Court took a lim-
ited view of the preemptive scope of 49 U.S.C. § 44112, which
limits the liability of a "lessor, owner, or secured party" for harm
"on land or water" to situations "only when a civil aircraft, air-
craft engine, or propeller is in the actual possession or control
of the lessor, owner, or secured party" and the harm "occurs
because of-(1) the aircraft, engine, or propeller; or (2) the
flight of, or an object falling from, the aircraft, engine, or pro-
peller. ' 314 In the Florida Supreme Court's view, the "on land or
water" provision serves to preempt only state-law claims involv-
ing victims who were outside the aircraft when injured, not (as
in that case) a victim who was riding inside the aircraft, even if it
could be said that the victim was injured "on land" as the result
of a crash."1 5
The case involved an aircraft leased by Danny Ferrer from a
company called Aerolease of America, Inc.3"' In January 2005,
308 Id.
309 Id. (citing Presidential Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27,
1988)).
310 Id. at 993.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313' 71 So. 3d 70 (Fla. 2011).
314 Id. at 72 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44112 (1994)).
315 Id. at 84-85.
316 Id. at 72.
2012] 309
310 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff in Lakeland, Florida. 17
A pilot as well as a passenger named Jose Martinez were on
board .3 1  The representative of the estate of a passenger killed
in the crash brought a wrongful-death suit against Aerolease as
the aircraft's owner.3 1 9 The suit made two main claims under
state law: first, that Aerolease was vicariously liable for the pilot's
negligent operation of the aircraft; and second, that there was
direct negligence on Aerolease's part when, before transferring
the aircraft to Ferrer, it performed inspection and
maintenance. 2 °
Aerolease moved for summary judgment based on federal
preemption under 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b), which the trial court
granted.3 21 The statute provides in relevant part:
A lessor, owner, or secured party is liable for personal injury,
death, or property loss or damage on land or water only when a
civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller is in the actual posses-
sion or control of the lessor, owner, or secured party, and the
personal injury, death, or property loss or damage occurs be-
cause of-
(1) the aircraft, engine, or propeller; or
(2) the flight of, or an object falling from, the aircraft, engine,
or propeller.
22
Under Florida's "dangerous instrumentality" doctrine, an
owner or lessor of an aircraft can be held vicariously liable for a
pilot's negligence. 2  The trial court agreed with Aerolease,
however, that Section 44112 preempted any liability under that
doctrine, or for its own alleged negligent inspection and mainte-
nance, because Aerolease was not in actual possession of the air-
craft at the time of the crash. 32' The plaintiff appealed, and the
intermediate appellate court issued a split decision: it affirmed
the judgment for Aerolease on the preemption of vicarious lia-
bility but allowed the claim to proceed based on Aerolease's own






322 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b) (1994)).
323 Id.
324 Id. at 72-73.
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was in Aerolease's possession. 25 The plaintiff appealed the ad-
verse ruling, and the Florida Supreme Court reversed.326
The key question was whether the phrase "personal injury...
on land or water" includes a victim of a plane crash who dies on
impact with the earth. 27 If so, then generally the federal statute
would preempt a state-law claim against a lessor, owner, or se-
cured party that is not in actual possession or control of the air-
craft. 28 Based on the statute's legislative history, the Florida
Supreme Court answered that question in the negative and al-
lowed the plaintiff to pursue his claim for vicarious liability
against Aerolease 29
The Florida Supreme Court relied heavily on a House of Rep-
resentatives report accompanying the original version of the
statute enacted in 1948, Section 504 of the Civil Aeronautics Act,
and determined that Congress wanted to shield people who own
aircraft for security purposes only but lack control over the air-
craft's operation, by removing the risk that such an owner could
be held liable based on such ownership.3 In particular, the
Florida Supreme Court determined that, in the 1948 statute,
"[t]he language clearly references airplane owner/lessor liabil-
ity for damages to persons and property that are on the surface of
the earth," as opposed to people riding in the aircraft.3 As an
example of state law that would be preempted, the House of
Representatives report cited the Uniform Aeronautics Act,
which was then in force in several states. 3 2 The Uniform Aero-
nautics Act apparently "imposed 'absolute liability on owners of
aircraft for damage caused on the surface of the earth,"' mean-
ing people or property on the ground, and it was this absolute
liability that the federal statute was meant to preempt.3 33 By
contrast, the Florida Supreme Court noted that "the Uniform
Aeronautics Act contained a separate section that addressed in-
juries to airmen or passengers who were in the plane at the time
of the incident"334 and concluded that the scope of federal pre-
325 Id.
326 Id. at 85.
327 Id. at 80.
328 Id.
329 Id. at 80-81.
350 Id. at 78-79.
331 Id. at 79.
332 Id. at 80.
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emption in the 1948 act was not meant to extend to such
injuries." 5
The Florida Supreme Court traced the history of the original
1948 act through the years: 1958-when it was incorporated
into the new Federal Aviation Act; 1959-when it was broad-
ened to include owners of engines, propellers, and aircraft; and
then 1994-"when, as part of a revision of Title 49 of the United
States Code, which governs transportation, it was merely re-
worded and recodified without substantive change as [S]ection
44112 (b). 36 Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court concluded
"that by adopting a federal law that specifically referenced dam-
ages or injuries that occur on the surface of the earth, the 1948
Congress did not intend to preempt state law with regard to in-
juries to passengers or aircraft crew. '337 The Florida Supreme
Court supported its decision with citations to other case law with
the same result.3 38 A dissenting justice contended that the
court's interpretation defied the plain meaning of the statutory
language: "Even though Martinez was in the aircraft when it hit
land, his death occurred 'on land,' not in the aircraft prior to
contact with land. The majority's view is inconsistent with the
plain meaning of the statute, specifically the plain meaning of
'on land.' ",139
Aerolease filed a petition for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme
Court, which the Court denied in February 2012.""
III. FEDERAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION,
REMOVAL, AND REMAND
In Brown v. Alaska Air Group, Inc., the court denied a motion
for remand.343 The eighty-four-year-old plaintiff fell while cross-
ing the tarmac shortly after deplaning at Seattle-Tacoma Inter-
national Airport and sued the airlines from whom she had
bought her tickets for failure to comply with the requirements
of the federal Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) for disabled pas-
sengers, as well as for state-law claims for discrimination, breach
of contract, and negligence. 42 The defendants removed the
335 Id.
336 Id. at 79.
337 Id. at 81.
33 Id. at 82.
39 Id. at 85-86 (Polston, J., dissenting).
340 Aerolease of Am. v. Vreeland, 132 S. Ct. 1557 (Feb. 21, 2012).
341 No. CV-11-0091-WFN, 2011 WL 2746251, at *5 (E.D. Wash. July 14, 2011).
342 Id. at *1.
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case, relying on the doctrine of field preemption. 43 The federal
court held that it was entitled to exercise subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the case:
[T] his Court finds pervasive regulations on the subject of failure
to provide transport services between planes. Specifically, the
ACAA and its regulations require airlines to provide "the services
of personnel and the use of ground wheelchairs, accessible mo-
torized carts, boarding wheelchairs, and/or on-board wheel-
chairs" and provide assistance in transporting a disabled
passenger, between her arriving and connecting flight. 44
Noting furthermore that, in the ACAA, Congress provided for
an administrative remedy scheme, the court determined that re-
moval was appropriate.345"
In Gardiner v. Kelowna Flightcraft, Ltd., a district court deter-
mined that 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (the diversity jurisdiction statute)
did not provide federal jurisdiction over a dispute involving the
plaintiffs decedent, who was a foreign national and a perma-
nent U.S. resident, and the defendant, a foreign company. 46
The court found that to hold otherwise would run afoul of Sec-
tion 2 of Article III of the Constitution:
47
The case arose out of a fatal plane crash in Ohio. 48 The
plaintiff, the decedent's widow, brought suit against Kelowna
Flightcraft, a Canadian company, in Ohio state court, and
Kelowna removed based on diversity of citizenship. 49 Because
the motion to remand implicated the constitutionality of 28
U.S.C. § 1332, the court allowed the United States to intervene,
supporting the plaintiff's argument against federal
jurisdiction. 5 °
At the heart of matter was the "deeming clause" of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332: "For purposes of this section, . . .an alien admitted to
the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a
343 Id.
344 Id. at *5 (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 382.95(a) (2009); 14 C.F.R. § 382.91 (2009))
(citing Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Exp. Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806, 809
(9th Cir. 2009)).
345 Id.
346 No. 2:10-cv-947, 2011 WL 3904997, at *1, *7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 6, 2011).
347 Id. at *3.
348 Id. at *1.
34) Id. The court first reviewed competing evidence to determine that the de-
cedent, who had been domiciled in Florida, was a citizen of the Bahamas with
permanent U.S. resident status. Id.
350 Id. at *2.
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citizen of the [s]tate in which such alien is domiciled. ''3 5 ' The
defendant urged the court to find federal jurisdiction based on
the plain meaning of the statute,352 as the decedent would thus
be deemed a citizen of Florida (where he had been a resi-
dent),353 and the lawsuit would be one between "citizens of a
[sitate and citizens or subjects of a foreign state.3 54 On the
other hand, the plaintiff and the United States pointed out that
such a reading would expand federal jurisdiction beyond what is
established in Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution. 55 The
court stated that "while Article 1II, [Section] 2 allows for suits
'between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citi-
zens or Subjects,' it does not permit actions between aliens. ' -3 56
The court noted that the Supreme Court in Hodgson v.
Bowerbank 57 had long ago determined "that if the Judiciary Act
of 1789 were interpreted to allow suits solely between aliens in
federal courts, the statutory provisions would be unconstitu-
tional. ' 358 The court determined, supported by a review of legis-
lative history, "that the deeming provision was intended by
Congress to restrict as opposed to expand diversity jurisdiction
in cases involving permanent resident aliens," and thus con-
strued 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in a manner that preserved the statute's
constitutionality.359 Significantly, the case before the court in-
volved "aliens on both sides of the dispute, '"360 and was thus dis-
tinguishable from cases that involved at least one citizen party
and aliens,361 which would not raise the same constitutional
issues.
3 6 2
351 Id. at *3 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006)).
352 Id.
353 The citizenship of the decedent, rather than the plaintiff widow who was
suing as personal representative of his estate, was determinative because, accord-
ing to §1332(c) (2), "the legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall be
deemed to be a citizen only of the same is] tate as the decedent." Id. (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (c)(2)).
354 Id. at *3 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(2)).
355 [d.
356 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
357 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809).
358 Gardiner, 2011 WL 3904997, at *3.
359 Id. at *6.
360 Id. at *5.
361 Id.
362 The court noted that the Constitution requires only minimal diversity, as
opposed to complete diversity: "While statutes vesting the district courts with di-
versity jurisdiction have usually been interpreted to require complete diversity-
that is, no plaintiff can share citizenship with any defendant-Article 11, [Sec-
tion] 2 of the Constitution itself has been construed to only require minimal
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In re Hudson River Mid-Air Collision on August 8, 200963 was a
wrongful-death case arising from a midair collision between a
Piper N71MC airplane and a Eurocopter N401LH carrying pas-
sengers on a sightseeing tour of New York City that caused both
aircraft to plummet into the Hudson River.364 The district court
dismissed the admiralty and maritime claims asserted by the rep-
resentatives of the Eurocopter's deceased passengers.3 65 The
court began with the applicable rule that "a party seeking to in-
voke federal admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333(1) over a tort claim must satisfy conditions both of loca-
tion and of connection with maritime activity. "366 The location
test was easily satisfied, since the aircraft "crashed over the Hud-
son River and landed in navigable waters. 367
However, the court was not persuaded that "the activity of tak-
ing a helicopter tour over the Hudson River has a substantial
relationship to traditional maritime activity."36  The court
reasoned:
This case will ultimately be about whether there were errors
made by the air traffic controller, and the Piper and Eurocopter
pilots, not about issues within "admiralty's area of particular com-
petence [such as] maritime liens, the general average, captures
and prizes, limitation of liability, cargo damage, and claims for
salvage. "369
The Eurocopter sightseeing tour was not an "activity tradition-
ally performed by [a] waterborne [vessel] .... There are many
ways to sightsee around the Hudson River, whether it [be] by
foot, by vehicle, by boat, or by air. '
Yellen v. Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc. arose from a fatal air-
craft accident on May 10, 2010, in Alabama, involving two Ten-
nessee citizens in a Cirrus SR-22 aircraft equipped with an
engine manufactured by Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc.
diversity, meaning that only one set of opposing parties must be diverse." Id. at
*5 (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967)).
363 No. 09-6142(DMC) (JAD), 2011 AL 2463527 (D.NJ. June 17, 2011).
364 Id. at *1.
365 Id. at *3.
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(TCM) .371 The plaintiffs filed suit in Pennsylvania state court
against TCM, its then-parent company Teledyne Technologies,
Inc., and three other entities (at one time affiliated in some way
with TCM) headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, as well as
against Cirrus-related entities.372 The plaintiffs alleged products
liability claims under state law including strict liability, negli-
gence, and breach of warranties, along with a count for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress.1
73
The defendants removed the action on two alternative
grounds: (1) federal question jurisdiction in light of the FAA's
role in certifying the engine in question; and (2) diversity juris-
diction, since the parties were completely diverse apart from the
three located in Pittsburgh, which the defendants contended
were fraudulently joined solely to prevent removal (due to the
so-called "forum defendant rule" of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)). 4
The plaintiffs moved to remand, and the court granted the
motion. 5
The court declined to exercise federal question jurisdiction
over the case. 76 The court noted that the Supreme Court in
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufac-
turing had observed: "'[I] n certain cases federal-question juris-
diction will [also] lie over state-law claims that implicate
significant federal issues,' even if they are not raised directly.31
77
However, following the lead of the later decision in Empire
Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 8 which stated that Grable
represents a "special and small category" of cases,3 79 the district
court found that, among other reasons, "though [those] claims
ar[ose] against the backdrop of a federal aviation regulatory
scheme, they sound [ed] in run-of-the-mill state tort law." 38 The
district court took the view that state "law applies to aviation ac-
cident cases even if the relevant standard of care is imported
from the federal regulatory regime."381
371 832 F. Supp. 2d 490, 492 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
372 Id.
373 Id.
374 Id. at 492-93.
375 Id. at 493.
376 Id. at 500.
377 Id. at 497 (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg.,
545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005)).
378 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006).
379 Id.
380 Yellen, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 499.
381 Id.
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The court also determined that diversity jurisdiction did not
exist over the action because there was some possibility that the
Pittsburgh defendants could be held liable and, therefore, the
forum defendant rule precluded removal. 2 First, a corporate
predecessor of TCM could be held liable on a negligent-design
claim, even if it was no longer affiliated with TCM at the time of
the engine's manufacture and sale in 2005.383 Second, the cor-
porate structure and reorganization of the Pittsburgh defend-
ants had not foreclosed their liability in the case. 84
In Weidler v. Professional Aircraft Maintenance,3 5 a wrongful-
death action arising from a crash of an airplane in Baja, Califor-
nia, the Central District of California found that the defendant
FAA-certified repair station's removal to federal court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (the Federal Officer Removal Statute) was
proper and therefore denied the plaintiffs' motion to
remand. 86
The court noted the basics of removal pursuant to the Federal
Officer Removal Statute in the Ninth Circuit: "'[F]ederal of-
ficers can remove both civil and criminal [actions] ... a federal
officer can remove a case even if the plaintiff couldn't have filed
the case in federal court in the first instance,' removals under
[the statute] are not subject to the well-pleaded complaint rule,"
and an officer qualifying under the statute could remove the
case unilaterally.38 7 In order for the defendant Wood Group,
the FAA-certified facility, to qualify under the statute, it "must
[have] satisf[ied] three elements: (1) it [was] a 'person' within
the meaning of the statute; (2) it acted under the direction of a
federal officer by demonstrating a causal nexus between plain-
tiffs [sic] claims and acts it performed under color of federal
office; and (3) it ha[d] raised a colorable federal defense." '
The court found that Wood Group satisfied all three ele-
ments. 3 89 First, as a private corporation, it qualified as a "per-
son" for purposes of the statute.390 Second, Wood Group
382 Id. at 501-09.
383 Id. at 507.
384 Id. at 508.
385 No. CV 10-09376 SJO (CWx), 2011 WL 2020654 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2011).
386 Id. at *2.
387 Id. at *1 (citing Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1253
(9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted)).
388 Id.
389 Id. at *2.
390 Id.
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established that it was "acting under" an officer of the United
States:
Defendant Wood Group was acting pursuant to an Air Agency
Certificate issued by the FAA under 14 C.F.R. [§] 145. Under its
14 C.F.R. [§1 145.201 authority, Defendant Wood Group
claim[ed] that it performed maintenance, preventive mainte-
nance and alternations in accordance with 14 C.F.R. [§] 143 and
returned to service any work it performed and certified planes as
airworthy under the authority of the FAA.3 '
The court disposed of the plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary
on this point by noting that 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d) grants the
FAA "the power to 'delegate to a qualified private person' mat-
ters relating to examination, inspection, and certification. '"392
"Because the FAA delegated [the power to certify aircraft com-
ponents' airworthiness] to [the] [d]efendant Wood Group
through an Air Agency Certificate, [the] [d]efendant Wood
Group ha[d] sufficiently demonstrated that it was 'acting under'
the authority of the FAA. ' 393 Third, the court found that Wood
Group raised "a colorable [federal] defense that it complied
with [FAA rules and regulations and that it] maintained, re-
paired, serviced, licensed, and otherwise certified as airworthy"
the subject aircraft's engine "pursuant to the Air Agency Certifi-
cate and as supervised and overseen by the FAA.
3 9 4
IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In Kraut v. Raisbeck Engineering, Inc., an unpublished decision
from the appellate division of the Superior Court of New Jersey
arising from a plane crash that killed five members of a family, a
North Carolina maintenance and repair facility was found to
have insufficient minimum contacts with New Jersey to establish
personal jurisdiction. 95
The defendant Air Wilmington (AW), a North Carolina cor-
poration with a single facility in Wilmington, North Carolina,
provided refueling and service work for the pilot, Dr. Jon
Kraut. 96 As the court noted, AW had no physical presence in
New Jersey, did not pay taxes there, and did not actively adver-
391 Id.
392 Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d)(1) (2006)).
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 No. A-4336-09T2, 2011 WL 3586136, at *1 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug.
17, 2011) (unpublished per curiarn opinion).
396 Id. at *1-2.
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tise there. 39 v AW service personnel would sometimes pilot
planes to New Jersey upon request, and the company sent fol-
low-up form letters to the owners of aircraft who had used its
facility or had landed at the adjacent airport, with some twenty
out of 785 such letters being sent to New Jersey residents. 98
The plaintiffs alleged that AW was identified on the website of
an aviation fuel supplier as a convenient stop for customers pi-
loting between New Jersey and the Bahamas; however, the fuel
supplier never told AW it would mention New Jersey on the web-
site, and the advertisement appeared on the website nearly
three years after the crash. 99 Lastly, the plaintiffs and AW dis-
puted whether AW knew that Dr. Kraut was a New Jersey
resident.400
In finding against jurisdiction, the court noted that AW "ac-
cepted business from a New Jersey customer on an ongoing ba-
sis. He was one of many customers from many states. All of the
business from this customer was conducted at [AW's] sole facil-
ity in North Carolina. It was business that [AW] did not reach
into New Jersey to solicit."4 '' It also found that AW's "possible
knowledge that the Krauts lived in New Jersey [was not] disposi-
tive of the jurisdictional issue."40 2 Based on these circumstances,
AW "could not have reasonably expected to be haled into court
in New Jersey. 40 3
In Burdick v. Dylan Aviation, LLC, a Montana federal district
court denied a defendant-helicopter owner's motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction in a wrongful-death action, find-
ing the ties between the defendant and its corporate parent,
which was doing business in Montana, to be dispositive of the
issue.40 4 The plaintiffs decedent, Mark Burdick, was perform-
ing a visual inspection of a power line in Montana in the course
of his employment with Haverfield Corporation when the heli-
copter he was flying in suddenly lost power and crashed.4 5 Bur-
dick, who was seated in the rear, was killed, while the pilot and
397 Id. at *2.
398 Id.
399 Id. at *2-3.
409 Id. at *3-5.
401 Id. at *10.
402 Id. at *5.
403 Id. at *10.
404 No. CV 10-48-BLGT RFC, 2011 WL 2462577, at *8 (D. Mont. June 17,
2011).
405 Id. at *1.
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front-seat passenger were seriously injured.40 6 The helicopter
was owned by the defendant Dylan, "a limited liability company
whose sole business [was] buying helicopters and leasing them
to Haverfield" and also ensuring that the helicopters were air-
worthy. 407 The court noted the intimate ties between Dylan and
Haverfield: among other factors, each member of Dylan was also
an employee of Haverfield, Dylan had "'general knowledge' of
where Haverfield was doing business," and "Dylan's records for
[the fallen helicopter were] maintained in Haverfield's
office .. "408
The court reasoned that specific long-arm jurisdiction was ap-
propriate under Montana law because Burdick's tort claims ac-
crued in Montana and because the exercise of jurisdiction
comported with due process. 4" Dylan received due process be-
cause the three-part test, established by the Montana Supreme
Court after adopting the Ninth Circuit's approach, was
satisfied.41 °
First, the court found that Dylan purposefully availed itself of
the Montana forum because the fallen helicopter "was not
brought into Montana by the unilateral act of a disinterested
third party .... Dylan was very aware of the actions of Haverfield
because the decision makers for both companies [were] the ex-
act same."41 The court determined that "Dylan's attempt to
minimize physical contacts with Montana through the use of
Haverfield [did] not alter the basic existence of Dylan's involve-
ment in, and its pecuniary benefit from, a full exploitation of
the market."41 2 As Dylan leased helicopters to Haverfield for use
in the continental United States and derived financial benefit
from lease payments and insurance proceeds (once the helicop-
ter had crashed) from the helicopter's use in Montana, it pur-
posefully availed itself of the Montana forum.413
Second, the wrongful-death action clearly arose from Mon-
tana-related activity. 414 And third, the court noted that exercise




409 Id. at *3-7.
410 Id. at *3 (citing Simmons v. Montana, 670 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Mont. 1983)).
411 Id. at *4.
412 Id. (citations omitted).
413 Id. at *5.
414 Id. at *6.
415 Id. at *6-7.
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court noted Dylan's arguments "that it would be burdensome to
defend [the] lawsuit in Montana [as the company was already]
defending" lawsuits filed by the two surviving passengers in
Pennsylvania.416 While the court recognized that it was easier to
"try a case all at once" with modern travel and communications,
"the burden [on Dylan] [was] not so great as to require
dismissal.,"417
In Garcia v. Wells Fargo Bank Northwest NA Trustee,41 the South-
ern District of Florida found that a bank that served as a "pas-
sive" trustee owner of an airplane was not subject to personal
jurisdiction in a wrongful-death action.419 The lawsuit arose out
of the crash of a Cessna 650 Citation in Venezuela that killed all
three occupants on board.42" Although none of the deceased
were citizens of Florida, the personal representative of one of
the deceased brought suit there.4 2' Defendant Wells Fargo
Bank Northwest NA (Wells Fargo) was the registered owner of
the Cessna at all relevant times.4 22
In finding against personal jurisdiction, the court determined
that Wells Fargo was neither incorporated nor licensed to do
business in Florida, nor did it have any physical presence or em-
ployees in Florida; it was only a passive trustee owner of the sub-
ject airplane, which was purchased and at times maintained in
Florida.423 Because federal law prohibits foreign citizens from
registering aircraft in the United States, Wells Fargo operated a
trust department that assisted foreign citizens with their registra-
tions.4 2 4 "As part of its trust agreement with foreign nationals,"
Wells Fargo served as the official owner of the aircraft but
"[ceded] all operational control of its airplanes to the lessee for
whom the trust [was] established. '425 Wells Fargo did not pro-
vide any funds for the purchase of the subject plane, and the
plaintiff did not provide any evidence regarding control by
Wells Fargo over the plane or evidence that Wells Fargo solic-
ited or advertised its business in Florida.4 26 The court found
416 Id. at *6.
417 Id.
418 No. 1:10-CV-20383-JLK, 2011 WL 3439530 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2011).
419 Id. at *1.
420 Id.
421 Id.
422 Id. at *2.
423 Id. at *6-7.
424 Id. at *1.
425 Id.
426 Id. at *1-2, *6.
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that "[t] he undisputed facts demonstrate [d] that if Wells Fargo
had any connection with Florida, it was purely tangential and
fortuitous. "427
Therefore, the plaintiffs allegations satisfied neither Florida's
long-arm jurisdiction statute nor constitutional notions of due
process.4 28 The court found that the sale and occasional mainte-
nance of the Cessna in Florida "may [have been] insufficient to
confer jurisdiction on the courts of [that] state." '4 29 However,
"[w]hen considered in the context of Wells Fargo's passive own-
ership of the subject airplane and lack of involvement or solicita-
tion in Florida, such sale and maintenance [was] certainly an
insufficient predicate for jurisdiction. '' 410
V. THE GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT OF
1994 (GARA) 431
In Burton v. Twin Commander Aircraft LLC,43 2 the Washington
Supreme Court held that GARA's eighteen-year statute of re-
pose barred a wrongful-death action against Twin Commander
because the fraud exception to GARA did not apply: "There
[was] no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Twin Com-
mander knowingly withheld information from the FAA that it
was required to report. 433
The action arose from a May 2004 crash in Mexico of a model
690C dual-engine turbo propeller plane, owned at that time by
the Mexican government.434 All seven government agents
aboard were killed.43 5 The action was filed in Washington state
court in 2005 by a personal representative of the decedents' es-
tates.43 16 The defendant, Twin Commander, did not actually
manufacture the aircraft, but was the current type certificate
holder.437 The Twin Commander series aircraft was originally
introduced by Rockwell International in 1971, and the type cer-
427 Id. at *4.
428 Id. at *7.
429 Id.
430 Id.
431 General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006)
[hereinafter GARA].
432 254 P.3d 778 (Wash. 2011).
431 Id. at 780.
434 Id. at 781.
435 Id.
436 Id.
437 Id. at 780.
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tificate for the series 690C was issued by the FAA in 1979.438 The
aircraft that crashed in 2004 had been manufactured by Gulf-
stream American Corporation, Rockwell's successor, in 1981."' 9
Later, in 1989, the defendant "acquired the 690-series type cer-
tificates but did not continue manufacturing the aircraft. '440 As
the type certificate holder, the defendant had reporting obliga-
tions to the FAA,4 4 1 as well as "the obligation to submit design
changes" in accordance with any FAA airworthiness directives
and to "prepare instructions for continued airworthiness that
met FAA approval. 442
In 2003, following two crashes of series 690B aircraft, Twin
Commander issued a service bulletin advising operators "to in-
spect the rudder cap for unusual wear, which could result in the
rudder cap separating from the aircraft." '443 According to a Mex-
ican government report, the aircraft at issue had been inspected
in accordance with the service bulletin.444 The suit alleged that
"service bulletin 235 was a defective product that caused the
crash" and that the defendant concealed information from the
FAA.445 In the trial court, Twin Commander successfully moved
for summary judgment under GARA, arguing that its status as
type certificate holder meant that it was a manufacturer under
GARA and therefore entitled to the eighteen-year repose pe-
riod, and that the service bulletin did not restart that period
under GARA's rolling provision for "any new component, sys-
tem, subassembly, or other part which replaced another compo-
nent, system, subassembly, or other part originally in, or which
was added to, the aircraft, and which is alleged to have caused
such death, injury, or damage." '446 The court of appeals re-
versed, finding that fact questions remained as to whether Twin
Commander was a "manufacturer" and whether Twin Com-
mander misled the FAA in reporting the rudder issue.44 7
The Washington Supreme Court took the case and decided




441 See id. at 780-81 (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.3, 21.7 (2009)).
442 Id.
443 Id. at 781.
444 Id.
445 Id.
446 Id. at 783 (quoting GARA § 2(a)(2)).
447 Id. at 781.
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all.448 First, the court stated: "A type certificate holder . . . as-
sumes the obligations of a manufacturer and is entitled to the
same protection of the statute of repose. We join the growing
majority of courts addressing this issue and hold that a type cer-
tificate holder is a 'manufacturer' for purposes of GARA's stat-
ute of repose. ' 449 Second, the court decided that the plaintiff
could not take advantage of the fraud exception to GARA's
bar.45° Any misrepresentation, concealment, or withholding of
information from the FAA must be knowing:
[C]onstruing "knowingly" to apply to all of the means by which
information may be kept from the FAA best carries out the bal-
ance that Congress intended by providing insulation from suit,
protecting the [general] aviation aircraft industry, and protect-
ing public safety while affording fair treatment to people injured
in aircraft accidents. 451
The Washington Supreme Court held that the plaintiff "must
plead and prove facts that would prove the fraud exception;" it
is not the defendant's burden to prove the absence of knowing
misrepresentation.452 One justice dissented, saying that the ma-
jority improperly placed this burden on the plaintiff and saying
that fact issues remained on the fraud exception.4 53 The court
then rejected the plaintiffs reliance on two e-mails and an ear-
lier 1992 accident, which the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) determined was caused by turbulence, as evi-
dence of such misrepresentation by Twin Commander.
4 54
In Inmon v. Air Tractor, Inc., the court affirmed summary judg-
ment in a manufacturer's favor based on GARA's eighteen-year
statute of repose (as well as Florida's twelve-year statute of re-
pose for products liability claims). 4  The plaintiff had been
dusting crops in an airplane that "was not considered airworthy
at the time because the plaintiff had failed to obtain a required
annual inspection" when "the right wing of his airplane sud-
448 Id. at 780.
449 Id. at 784 (citing S. Side Trust & Sav. Bank of Peoria v. Mitsubishi Heavy
Indus. Ltd., 927 N.E.2d 179 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Mason v. Schweizer Aircraft
Corp., 653 N.W.2d 543 (Iowa 2002); Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 905 A.2d
422 (Pa. 2006), adhered to on reargument, 916 A.2d 619 (Pa. 2007)).
450 Id. at 791.
451 Id. at 786.
452 -d.
453 Id. at 792 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
454 Id. at 787-90.
455 74 So. 3d 534, 538-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
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denly failed. '456 The airplane was manufactured in 1982.457 In
1993, the manufacturer designed and sold a wing modification
kit that was supposed to extend the safe life of the aircraft by
means of "a new spar splice with an additional fifth bolt hole
further out from the centerline of the aircraft and installing it
on the existing lower wing spar cap. ' 458 The manufacturer is-
sued several service bulletins related to installation of the new
spar splice.459
The manufacturer moved for summary judgment, arguing
"that the spar splice did not cause the accident and therefore
the addition of the new part could not restart the applicable
statutes of repose. '"460 The trial court granted the motion and
determined that the various service bulletins did not affect the
running of the repose period.46" ' In addition, the trial court dis-
missed the complaint "as a sanction for violating numerous
court orders. 4 62 The plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court
affirmed.4
6 3
The court held that "service bulletins do not constitute a 'new
part'" under GARA: "as one court wrote, 'given the continual
issuance of service bulletins pertaining to a variety of topics, if
the statute of repose [were] triggered every time a service bulle-
tin was issued, the intent of GARA would be eviscerated.' 
464
The plaintiff had also "failed to demonstrate that the new part
actually caused the accident.
465
In Nowicki v. Cessna Aircraft Co., the appellate court affirmed
summary judgment in the defendant manufacturer's favor,
holding that GARA barred the plaintiff's products liability
claims.466 The action arose from a June 2003 crash in Florida
involving a Cessna Model 414 aircraft that was manufactured
and delivered to its first owner thirty-three years earlier, in
1970.467 While the pilot survived, his two passengers were
456 Id. at 536.
457 [d.
458 Id.
459 Id. at 536-37.
460 Id. at 537.
461 Id.
462 1d.
463 Id. at 538-39.
464 Id. at 538 (quoting Moyer v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors, Inc., 979 A.2d 336,
344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
465 Id. at 539.
466 69 So. 3d 406, 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
467 Id.
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killed.468 One of the passengers' estates brought the lawsuit.469
Notably, the cause of the crash was undisputed: the aircraft ran
out of fuel.4 70 But the plaintiff's theory of liability was that the
"death was caused by a defective rear passenger seat, which de-
tached from the rails and caused Nowicki to violently strike his
head inside the airplane on or before impact. '4 7 Cessna moved
for summary judgment, citing GARA's eighteen-year statute of
repose as well as Florida's twelve-year statute of repose.472
The plaintiffs opposition focused on an airworthiness direc-
tive (AD) that had been issued for the aircraft's seat assembly.473
The directive addressed situations where slippage of the seat as-
sembly, when used by a pilot, had resulted in a loss of control of
the aircraft.4 74 The plaintiff argued that Cessna had knowingly
concealed from the FAA that its Model 414 aircraft contained
the same seat assembly, albeit used for a passenger instead of a
pilot.4 75 But the trial court found this distinction, seized on by
the defendant, dispositive, rejecting the plaintiff's argument
precisely "because the AD addressed the 'seat slippage' concern
only as it presented an unsafe condition in crew seats-not in
passenger seats. 476 The plaintiff appealed, and the appellate
court affirmed.477
The appellate court determined that the trial court erred by
placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove that the fraud ex-
ception applied.478 While, under Florida law, the usual order-of-
proof principle would require the plaintiff to carry the burden
of proving an exception (once the defendant had carried the
initial burden of showing the statute applied on its face), the
court found significant that the plaintiff had raised its defense
to the statute before summary judgment, therefore "Cessna
could not establish the claim was time-barred, for summaryjudg-
ment purposes, until it established the GARA exception was in-






473 Id. at 408.
474 Id.
475 Id. at 408-09.
476 Id. at 409.
477 Id. at 407.
478 Id. at 410.
479 Id.
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harmless, as the manufacturer still successfully carried the bur-
den of showing that the exception did not apply.48 ° While the
court's reasoning was not completely clear, it seemed to find
persuasive Cessna's argument that, even if there had been con-
cealment, there was no causal relation to the injury; the airwor-
thiness directive was aimed solely at slippage of pilots' seats in
order to prevent loss of control of the aircraft, which was not a
problem in that case.4 ' As a result, the claims were barred.482
In United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Nabtesco Corp., the
court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding
that GARA's statute of repose barred a suit alleging a defective
landing gear actuator that collapsed on landing.8 3 The inci-
dent in question happened in August 2009.484 The actuator in
question was originally manufactured in March 1990 and in-
stalled on a Cessna aircraft (not the accident aircraft) that was
first sold in October 1990 (i.e., more than eighteen years before
the incident).485 Some time later, the actuator was sold to Mid-
west Jet Corporation, which overhauled the component and, in
April 2007, installed it on the aircraft that suffered the gear col-
lapse.486 That aircraft was sold to its first purchaser in December
1991 (i.e., less than eighteen years before the incident).487
The question in the case was to identify the trigger date that
started GARA's eighteen-year repose period: the defendants ar-
gued that the key date was the sale of the first aircraft in Octo-
ber 1990 (when the actuator was first installed), while the
plaintiff contended that the key date was the sale of the accident
aircraft in December 1991, or alternatively, April 2007, when the
actuator was installed on the accident aircraft.4 88 The court
noted that GARA has two alternative trigger dates: either "when
the manufacturer delivers 'the aircraft' to the first purchaser or
lessee" or the "rolling trigger date," when a "new" component
replaces a component or is added to the aircraft and allegedly
causes the accident. 48 9
480 Id.
481 See id. at 410-11.
482 [d.





488 h(. at *2.
489 Id. (citing GARA § 2(a)(1)(2)).
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The plaintiff interpreted the GARA provision stating that "no
civil action for damages for death or injury to persons or dam-
age to property arising out of an accident involving a general
aviation aircraft may be brought against the manufacturer of the
aircraft. '49' The plaintiff argued that GARA uses the term "the
aircraft" as "synonymous with 'general aviation aircraft,"' and
hence the accident aircraft sale in December 1991 was the trig-
ger date.4" The court rejected this argument, holding that
"'the aircraft' in GARA § 2(a) (1) is not synonymous with 'gen-
eral aviation aircraft,' because an aircraft is not a general avia-
tion aircraft until after it has been in an accident. "492 "Instead,
when the case involves components that have been removed
from one aircraft and installed on another, the relevant aircraft
for purposes of GARA's first triggering provision is the aircraft
in which the components were originally installed."'4 93 The
court also rejected the argument that the overhaul and installa-
tion of the actuator in 2007 mattered, holding: "The overhaul of
a component does not restart the repose period as to the manu-
facturer." '494 GARA's rolling provision therefore did not apply,
and the relevant date that triggered the repose period was the
first sale of the first aircraft bearing the allegedly defective part
in October 1990. 49 5
Scott v. MD Helicopters, Inc. arose from a crash of a military
surplus OH-6A helicopter in May 2007 that killed the person
aboard, allegedly the result of a defective main rotor hub.496
The helicopter had been converted into a Hughes 369A helicop-
ter in 2004 by Lance Aviation.49 7 Shortly before the crash,
Lance Aviation had been performing maintenance on the air-
craft when the main rotor hub failed an inspection. 498 "Lance
sent the part to Triumph Gear Systems for overhaul, but ulti-
mately installed a replacement hub out of its inventory. The
main rotor retention strap assembly that [was] part of the hub
490 Id. at *1 (quoting GARA § 2(a)).
491 Id. at *2.
492 Id. at *3 (citing Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 283 F.3d
1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Under GARA, an aircraft cannot fulfill the defini-
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failed. 499 "It [was] undisputed that the [strap pack assembly]
... was not an original military hub because [it] was not sold
until 1993."500 Scott, the plaintiff, sued MD Helicopters, Inc.
(MDHI), among others, in strict liability and for negligence pri-
marily on the basis of MDHI's status as type certificate holder
for the aircraft and the duties accompanying that status.5 °1 The
plaintiff contended that MDHI should be held liable for inade-
quate maintenance manuals.5 °2 MDHI moved for summary
judgment.503
At the outset, the plaintiff conceded that MDHI was entitled
to summary judgment on the strict-liability claims (presumably
because MDHI had not designed, manufactured, or sold the
products in question, although the opinion does not say).504
However, the court went on to deny summary judgment on the
negligence claim.50 5 First, the court decided that there were fact
questions regarding MDHI's duty to provide instructions for
continued airworthiness-in particular, maintenance manu-
als. 50 6 "However, the duty depend [ed], in part, upon factual cir-
cumstances-changes to the instructions. It [was] unclear if or
when MDHI's instructions changed and, if so, how those
changes were distributed. 5 7 Based on that fact question, the
court denied the motion.50 ' Second, the plaintiff argued that
MDHI's alleged "failure to comply with its regulatory duties con-
stitute[d] negligence per se." 50 9 But the defendant countered
that whoever had been responsible for incorrectly installing the
strap pack was not an approved source and performed the work
without approved manuals.510  That improper maintenance
therefore constituted an unforeseeable intervening cause.1
The court determined that fact questions on that issue also re-






504 Id. at 1337.
505 Id. at 1338-39.




510 Id. at 1339.
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The court rejected affirmative defenses raised by MDHI.513 In
addition to rejecting defenses based on successor liability, gov-
ernment contractor status, and a Florida general statute of re-
pose, the court notably rejected a GARA statute of repose
defense. 514 The court accepted the plaintiff's theory of the case
as being based on a defective manual, not on the helicopter it-
self (first sold around 1968) or the failed strap pack, which
MDHI did not manufacture: "Because a maintenance manual is
not a part, GARA does not bar claims involving maintenance
manual defects. ' 51 5 The court also disagreed that this was akin
to "a claim for 'failure to warn,' which is barred by GARA. 516
The [c] ourt finds, however, that Scott's claim does not neatly fit
that category, in part because the claim focuses on FAA regula-
tions. It does not follow that the FAA would require manufactur-
ers to make available changes to maintenance manuals if failure
to do so were protected by the statute of repose. The [c]ourt
therefore finds that Scott's negligence claim is not barred by
GARA.5 1 7
In Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., the court denied summary judg-
ment to Cessna, which had relied on GARA's statute of repose
to bar claims against it based on its sale of an allegedly defective
part.5 " The action arose from a fatal February 2008 crash of a
Cessna Citation III.1'1 According to the plaintiff, the monitor in
the actuator control unit "failed to detect wear in the no-back
brake, which eventually failed, causing the nose of the aircraft to
pitch down, resulting in a crash. '5 20 While the aircraft in ques-
tion had been delivered by Cessna to its first purchaser more
than twenty years before the crash, a new actuator control unit
was installed in 2006.521
The parties disputed whether Cessna could be held liable as a
co-designer of the replacement actuator control unit, but the
decision turned instead on the fact that, in 2006, Cessna sold
the replacement part to the company that installed the part on
513 Id. at 1339-41.
514 Id. at 1339-40.
515 Id. at 1340.
516 Id. (citation omitted).
517 Id.







the aircraft.522 Cessna relied on the House of Representatives
Judiciary Committee notes on GARA stating:
For example, in the event a party who happened to be a manu-
facturer committed some negligent act as a mechanic of an air-
craft or as a pilot, and such act was a proximate cause of an
accident, the victims would not be barred from bringing a civil
suit for damages against that party in its capacity as a
mechanic.
52-
Although this passage seems, if anything, to limit GARA's
reach, Cessna contended that GARA "should still shield manu-
facturers when they are sued in an incidental role that created
no additional risk. ' 524 The court rejected this interpretation,
holding that GARA shields only manufacturers in their capacity
as such and, according to Cessna's own version of the facts, it
was not a manufacturer. 525 Therefore GARA did not apply. 526
Hence,
the quoted text does not at all suggest that Congress intended to
shield manufacturers facing liability for doing something other
than manufacturing the aircraft or part at issue. It suggests the
opposite-i.e., that GARA only protects manufacturers when they
are sued in that role .... Here, Cessna is being sued in its capac-
ity as seller of the new part, and therefore GARA does not bar
this suit.5
2 v
In Crouch v. Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc., the court denied
the defendant's motion for summary judgment.528 In Novem-
ber 2006, Larry Crouch was piloting his Piper single-engine air-
craft over Kentucky with a single passenger, Teddy Lee Hudson,
when the engine lost power and made a hard crash landing, in-
juring the two men. 529 The aircraft's engine was manufactured
by Lycoming in 1977 and installed in the accident aircraft in
1978, which was also the year of the aircraft's delivery to its first
purchaser.53 ° In 2005, the engine was overhauled byJohnJewell
Aircraft, Inc., and the original magneto replaced.53' The re-
522 Id. at *2.





528 833 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1338 (S.D. Ala. 2011).
529 Id. at 1332.
530 Id. at 1333.
531 Id.
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placement magneto was factory-rebuilt by TCM in 2005; at that
time, the magneto was put in new housing that included metal
tabs, or flanges, that secured the magneto to the engine. 2
"The magneto housing was new, including the two flanges, and
was manufactured in 2005 by TCM. The magneto was attached
to the engine using the original Lycoming clamps, washers, and
nuts. '513 In addition, the magneto gasket was manufactured by
Superior.5 3 4 Among other ideas, the plaintiffs advanced a the-
ory that the loss of engine power was caused by the magneto's
flanges breaking as a result of fatigue fractures.5 5
TCM moved for summary judgment under GARA's statute of
repose.5 36 The court denied the motion.537 TCM's first argu-
ment was that the flange design predated the crash by more
than eighteen years and had not been substantially altered in
the meantime. 8 Hence, GARA should have barred the claims
for a design defect. 53 9 While the court accepted that the design
had not changed, it focused on the fact that the flange installed
in the aircraft was a new part, regardless of when it had been
designed:
[T] he plain language of GARA provides no such protection. The
"rolling" provision clearly provides that the period for bringing a
cause of action restarts each time a "new" part replaces an old
part and the "new" part, i.e. the flange, is alleged to be the prob-
lem. The "rolling" provision does not require that the part be
newly designed, rather it only requires it to be a new part.
540
TCM argued next that, indisputably, the magneto and its
flanges did not cause the loss of power, based on air traffic con-
trol transcripts in which the pilot reported that he had had an
engine fire, not failure, ground witnesses who reported hearing
engine noise while the aircraft was in the air, and expert witness
testimony that the flanges broke on impact.541 However, the
court determined that it should not weigh evidence or make a
532 Id.
533 Id. at 1333-34.
534 Id. at 1338.
535 Id. at 1333.
536 Id. at 1332.
537 Id. at 1338.
538 Id. at 1335-36.
539 Id.
540 Id. at 1336.
541 Id. at 1336-37.
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credibility determination at that point and so declined to
rule.542
Third and finally, TCM argued that it could not be held liable
for a failure to warn of issues with respect to Superior's gasket or
Lycoming's attachment hardware for securing the magneto to
Lycoming's engine. 543  The court held: "However, [the]
[p] laintiffs' 'failure to warn' claim [was] based on its allegations
that TCM had knowledge but failed to warn that the magneto
housing flanges may develop fatigue fractures which could re-
sult in the flanges cracking and the magneto disengaging from
the engine. 544
Later at trial, TCM won a complete defense verdict.54 5 The
plaintiffs have appealed the verdict to the Eleventh Circuit,
where the appeal is pending as case number 11-13811. 511
A companion case to the Alabama Crouch case has been pend-
ing in Kentucky federal court (the action was originally filed in
Kentucky federal court; TCM was dismissed from that action for
lack of personal jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs brought a new
suit against TCM in Alabama) .5" The defendants in Kentucky
included Avco Corporation, Lycoming's successor.548 In Crouch
v. Honeywell International, Inc., the court denied the plaintiffs'
motion for reconsideration of a grant of summary judgment for
Avco Corporation.549 In a 2010 decision, the court had deter-
mined that an engine maintenance manual qualified for protec-
tion under GARA's statute of repose, since it "[was] an essential
element in the overall process of creating a product that satisfies
FAA regulations" and that therefore Avco was acting in its capac-
ity as a manufacturer when it published the manual.55 °
The plaintiffs argued that the manual was not a "part" and
therefore that GARA could not protect Avco for alleged flaws in
the manual.551 The court rejected this argument, since "their
542 Id. at 1337.
543 Id. at 1337-38.
544 Id. at 1338.
545 Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 4, Crouch v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors, Inc.,
No. 11-13811 (llth Cir. June 4, 2012).
546 Id. at 2.
547 See Crouch v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-638-S, 2011 WL 3627283, at
*1 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 17, 2011).
548 Id.
-549 Id. at *4.
550 Crouch v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-638-S, 2010 WL 4449222, at *2
(W.D. Ky. Nov. 1, 2010).
551 Crouch, 2011 WIL 3627283, at *3.
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entire claim vis a vis the manual rest[ed] on their claim that the
manual, and subsequent service bulletins, failed to provide any
warning that the magneto assembly in Crouch's plane might
come loose. This is precisely the sort of action that GARA for-
bids. ' 552 The court also rejected the plaintiffs' attempts to
amend their complaint based on supposedly newly discovered
evidence showing knowing concealment by Avco with respect to
the FAA, in particular, Lycoming service bulletins dating from
2002, 2003, and 2007 "that identif[ied] problems with the
magneto assembly in some types of Lycoming engines. ' 55 ' Not-
ing that the plaintiffs had been in possession of these bulletins
for almost a year and yet said nothing until losing summary
judgment, the court stated that it "[would] not excuse their at-
tempt to pass off evidence that had been in their possession for
months as 'newly discovered"' and denied the requests.5 54
The plaintiffs have sought to appeal the various orders letting
Avco out of the case, but the Sixth Circuit has noted that such
orders are nonfinal since claims remain against other defend-
ants.5 55 The court of appeals ordered the plaintiffs to show
cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of juris-
diction, but has not ruled on the issue.556
VI. EVIDENCE AND EXPERTS
In Competitor Liaison Bureau, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,55v a case
in the Middle District of Florida, the defendant, the Cessna Air-
craft Company, put forth an expert in aviation accident investi-
gation and reconstruction, Tommy McFall, to testify that the
cause of the airplane crash in the case was poor aircraft mainte-
nance, a malfunctioning radar unit, and pilot error in response
to an emergency. 558 The plaintiffs challenged the expert on the
grounds that he had no expertise in metallurgical engineering,
fire cause and origin, toxicology, or aircraft maintenance, and
that experience in those areas was necessary to offer an opinion
552 Id.
553 id. at *2.
554 Id.
555 See Crouch v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-638-S, 2012 WL 2521327, at
*2 (W.D. Ky. June 28, 2012).
556 Id.
557 No. 6:08-cv-2165-Orl-28GJK, 2011 WL 1152127 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2011)
(Mag. J. Rep. & Rec.), adopted, 2011 WL 1325603 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2011).
558 Id. at *1.
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on the cause of the crash in that case. 559 The plaintiffs also ob-
jected on the grounds that Mr. McFall lacked sufficient facts to
support his conclusions.56 °
On the issue of metallurgy, Mr. McFall relied on a report by
an acknowledged expert in that field in order to establish an
opinion that a fire onboard the aircraft was caused by an electri-
cal fault associated with the weather radar.56' On the issue of
toxicology, Mr. McFall's opinions were based heavily on the lack
of soot in the pilot's larynx and thyroid, which Mr. McFall inter-
preted as evidence that no fire was in the cabin.562 On the main-
tenance issue, Mr. McFall relied upon his knowledge and
experience as a pilot and accident reconstruction expert to offer
testimony that the owners of the plane at issue failed to properly
respond to mechanical issues that the aircraft was experiencing
well before the crash.5
63
The magistrate judge ultimately ruled against all of the plain-
tiffs' objections and allowed Mr. McFall to testify.56 4 The judge
found that the facts and evidence provided by the expert in
metallurgy were of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in
aircraft accident reconstruction, and thus it was permissible for
Mr. McFall to rely upon this evidence in making his own expert
determination on crash causation.565 The judge also found that
Mr. McFall's testimony regarding toxicology and maintenance
were within the scope of his expertise as an aviation accident
reconstruction expert.566 The court found that it was reasona-
ble for Mr. McFall to testify as to the lack of smoke in the pilot's
larynx.567 The court also found that it was within Mr. McFall's
expertise as an experienced pilot to testify that the aircraft had
not been properly maintained.56 8 The judge further found that
Mr. McFall had sufficient facts to testify, as there was circumstan-
tial evidence to support his opinions, and circumstantial evi-
dence is typically relied upon in aviation reconstruction cases.56 9
559 Id. at *5.
560 Id. at *5-7.
561 Id. at *5.
562 Id.
563 id. at *6-7.
564 Id. at *8.
565 Id. at *5.
566 Id.
567 Id.
568 Id. at *6.
569 Id. at *8.
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Damian v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.5 70 decided, among other
things, that an expert in bird-impact transparency design, who
had extensive expertise in designing transparencies for air-
planes, but only limited experience working with large helicop-
ters and none with small helicopters, was not qualified to testify
regarding an alternative design for a bird-impact resistant wind-
shield on a small helicopter.57 1
The plaintiffs' expert, Billy Hinds, testified that the acrylic
used in the windshield of a Bell 407 helicopter was defectively
designed because it was not bird-impact resistant, and that the
technology existed for such a windshield at the time of the heli-
copter's design.572 The court found that Mr. Hinds had no ex-
perience with helicopters of that size, no way of knowing if
attaching a bird-proof windshield was feasible for such a craft,
had done no testing of his alternative design, and had never
used that design in a non-judicial setting.573 Mr. Hinds's only
response was that "there probably wouldn't have had to be
much change to the structure" with no basis for that opinion
and a general opinion that all types of aircraft are essentially the
same and employ the same basic principles of flight.
574
The court found that, since Mr. Hinds had no expertise in
helicopter design and had cited no study or article to support
his proposed new design, there was no justifiable method of de-
termining whether his design was safer than the design used or
if his design was even feasible.575 Thus his testimony could not
meet the standards of Daubert."76 Mr. Hinds's argument that his
experience with airplanes was sufficient to apply to helicopters
because the basic principles for any aircraft are "basically the
same" was rejected, with the court finding that it is important
for the purposes of providing an alternative design that the ex-
pert have the knowledge and expertise to determine if the alter-
native design is actually feasible and safer than the original
design.577 In addition, the court found that Mr. Hinds had
570 352 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied).
571 Id. at 132.
572 Id.
573 Id. at 149-51.
574 Id. at 147.
575 Id. at 152.
576 Id. at 151; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
577 Damian, 352 S.W.3d at 150.
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never used a design similar to the one he was offering in testi-
mony in his own work outside the judicial context.578
VII. CHOICE OF LAW
In Pestel v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.,5 79 a pilot sought damages
against Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation for injuries suffered
after falling from a retractable ladder installed in the aircraft
while parked briefly on the tarmac at the Narita International
Airport in Japan.5 8 0 The plaintiff "ultimately lost his pilot's li-
cense because he was unable to pass the required medical exam-
inations based on his injuries. 581
In determining which jurisdiction's law applied, Judge James
Zagel employed Illinois's choice-of-law test-the "most signifi-
cant relationship"-as discussed in the Second Restatement of
Conflicts of Laws.582 Judge Zagel found that, although the situs
of the injury was Japan, this "fortuitous" location was not of sig-
nificant importance; rather, Illinois's decided interest in pro-
tecting its citizens from potentially harmful products, coupled
with the parties' likely expectations that Illinois law would gov-
ern, proved superior.583 These expectations were deemed valid,
"considering that the plaintiff and the defendant only came to-
gether because of the fact that McDonald's Corporation's Illi-
nois headquarters purchased the aircraft, brought it to Illinois,
and had the plaintiff (himself an Illinois citizen) fly it to and
from the state of Illinois."584
In Powers v. Lycoming Engines,585 the plaintiffs in a putative
class action sought damages for engines they claimed "were
manufactured with defective crankshafts" capable of causing a
"total loss of engine power and in-flight engine failures. ' 586 The
plaintiffs alleged that "Lycoming knew of and concealed the de-
fect that prevented the crankshafts from functioning as
intended. 58 v
578 Id. at 150-51.
579 No. 09 CV 6113, 2011 WL 3157294 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2011).
I80 Id. at *1.
581 Id.
582 Id.
583 Id. at *2.
584 Id. at *3.
585 272 F.R.D. 414 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
586 Id. at 417.
587 Id.
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Of the fifty jurisdictions represented, "thirty-one states, in-
cluding Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia, [did] not
require privity of contract to recover for breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability where only economic damages are
involved." '588 The remaining eighteen jurisdictions required
privity between the parties. 5 9
The plaintiffs argued that Pennsylvania law should apply to
their breach-of-implied-warranty claim because-even if there
was a true conflict with other states-"Pennsylvania [had] signif-
icant contacts with the contract for the sale of the aircraft and
[had] a materially greater interest in having its law applied. 590
Lycoming, located in Williamsport, Pennsylvania, contended
that Pennsylvania law should not be applied because "Penn-
sylvania [did] not have significant contacts with the contract for
the sale of each aircraft. 5 '
The district court used Pennsylvania's two-step process to re-
solve the choice-of-law question. 592 The court first determined
whether the competing states' governmental interests would be
frustrated by application of the other states' laws.593 The court
referred to the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws and
weighed the following five factors to determine which state's
laws would have the most significant relationship with the trans-
action and the parties: "(1) where the contract was made; (2)
where it was negotiated; (3) where it was performed; (4) the
location of the subject matter of the contract; and (5) the domi-
cile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties. "51 4
"Weighing the above contacts on a qualitative scale, [the
court] conclude[d] that each putative class member's state of
purchase had the most significant relationship with each con-
tract. ' 595 The court held (1) that members of the class had a
588 Id. at 420.
589 Id.
590 Id. at 417.
591 Id.
592 Id. at 419.
593 Id. at 420-21. That is, would allowing plaintiffs to sue a manufacturer with
whom they did not deal directly frustrate the interests of those states that require
privity for breach of implied warranties? Or conversely, would insulating Lycom-
ing from suit frustrate Pennsylvania's interest in holding responsible a manufac-
turer that has placed a defective product in the stream of commerce?
594 Id. at 421-22 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188
(1971)).
595 Id. at 423.
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"due process right to have their claims decided by application of
their own state's laws"; (2) that Pennsylvania did not have the
requisite aggregation of significant contacts that would "ensure
the application of its law[s] [would] not be 'arbitrary or un-
fair'"; and (3) that "applying Pennsylvania law to each class
member's implied warranty of merchantability claim would vio-
late both the Due Process and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause [s] .596
The plaintiffs' motion for class certification was initially
granted by the District Court.597 Lycoming appealed the class
certification order, and the Third Circuit vacated the order cer-
tifying the class and remanded the case requesting a new
analysis.598
VIII. MONTREAL 599 AND WARSAW 600 CONVENTIONS
In Aina v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,6"1 the plaintiff asserted
claims for libel and for breach of contract for the delayed ship-
ment of computer equipment and baby-care products when his
packages were ultimately delivered to his Nigerian place of busi-
ness with the words "Nigerian Fraud Intercept" printed across
them.60 2 The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing
that the plaintiffs claims were preempted by the Warsaw Con-
vention as amended by the Hague Protocol, since both the
United States and Nigeria are signatories to the treaty.60 3
In granting summary judgment, the court found that the
plaintiffs state-law claims for breach of contract and libel were
preempted by the Warsaw Convention, which had created
causes of action for loss, damage, or delay to packages and was
the exclusive remedy against international carriers for partici-
pating countries.60 4
596 Id. at 424.
597 Powers v. Lycoming Engines, Inc., 328 F. App'x 121, 122 (3d Cir. 2009).
598 Id. at 128.
599 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 106-45, 2242 U.N.T.S. 350 [hereinafter
Montreal Convention].
600 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
601 No. H-10-3655, 2011 WL 4458761 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2011).
602 Id. at *1.
-'3 Id. at *3.
604 Id.; see also Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw 12 October
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In AXA Art Insurance Corp. v. Art Courier,6 05 the plaintiff
brought an action against the defendants "seeking recovery for a
Brice Marden painting entitled Au Centre (1969) . .. that was
damaged in Frankfurt, Germany, while in transit from Moscow
to New York via Lufthansa Airlines."60 6 The painting, valued at
$2.8 million, suffered damage to all four corners, could not be
restored, and suffered a total loss.60 7
"It [was] undisputed that Lufthansa accepted the painting in
good condition and delivered it in damaged condition. 60
When an item is damaged in international transit, the carrier is
presumed liable pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, and the
only dispute there was "whether the Warsaw Convention limited
Lufthansa's liability. ' 60 9 Under the convention, the carrier must
provide a waybill that contains:
a notice to the consignor to the effect that, if the carriage in-
volves an ultimate destination of stop in a country other than the
country of departure, the Warsaw Convention may be applicable
and that the [c]onvention governs and in most cases limits the
liability of carriers in respect of loss of or damage to cargo.610
Since Lufthansa failed to submit evidence that demonstrated
proper notice, Judge Jed Rakoff granted the plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment against Lufthansa in the amount of $2.8
million.61'
In Cardoza v. Spirit Airlines, Inc.,6 12 the "[p]laintiff... , as per-
sonal representative of the estate of Gertrudis Cardoza-Sori,
filed a one-count complaint for absolute liability under Article
17 of the Montreal Convention" after Ms. Cardoza-Sori col-
lapsed and died while on board Spirit Airlines (Spirit) Flight
716 from Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic to Fort Lauder-
1929, arts. I, XVIII, XIX, XXIV, opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S.
[hereinafter Hague Protocol]. The Fifth Circuit found that the Warsaw Conven-
tion provided the exclusive remedy of international air carriers by providing an
independent cause of action, thereby preempting state law. Boehr-
inger-Mannheim Diagnostics Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways Inc., 737 F.2d 456,
458 (5th Cir. 1984).
605 No. 09 Civ. 7362(JSR), 2011 WL 2749885 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2011).
606 Id. at *1.
607 Id. at *2.
608 Id. at *3.
609 Id.
610 Id. (quoting Hague Protocol, supra note 604, arts. VI-VIII).
611 Id.
612 No. 10-61668-Civ., 2011 WL 2447523 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 2011).
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dale, Florida.613 Spirit moved for summary judgment, and the
plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment.614
"Article 17 of the Montreal Convention .. .imposes liability
on an aircraft carrier when an 'accident' causes a passenger's
death or bodily injury [during] an international flight.16 15 "A
flight crew's inaction may constitute an 'accident.' 616
The [p]laintiff identifie[d] three "accidents," which caused Ms.
Cardoza-Sori's death: (i) Spirit did not make an announcement
to see if there was a physician aboard the plane; (ii) Spirit did not
attempt to use its onboard [Automated External Defibrillator
(AED)] to revive Ms. Cardoza-Sori; and (iii) Spirit and its pilots
did not divert to a "closer" airport, but continued to the in-
tended destination.61 7
Evidence was provided that refuted the first "accident" as
claimed by plaintiff.618 The court found that, because of con-
flicting evidence regarding the remaining two "accidents"
("whether Spirit flight attendants' failure to use the AED was
'unexpected or unusual' and whether the pilots' decision to
continue on to Fort Lauderdale instead of landing in Nassau or
Miami was 'unexpected or unusual"'), summary judgment was
not proper.61 9 In denying both motions, the court determined
that whether or not an "accident" within the meaning of Article
17 caused Ms. Cardoza-Sori's death "involve[d] disputed ques-
tions of material fact for the jury. 620
In Chubb Insurance Co. of Europe v. Menlo Worldwide Forwarding,
Inc.,6 2 the facts were as follows:
On November 14, 2004, Air New Zealand Engineering, Ltd. con-
tracted with Menlo Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. (Menlo) to ship
a turbine aircraft engine from New Zealand to the United States.
613 Id. at *1-2.
614 Id. at *2.
615 Id. at *3. An accident is "an unexpected or unusual event or happening
that is external to the passenger" and not "the passenger's own internal reaction
to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft." Air Fr. v. Saks, 470
U.S. 392, 405-06 (1985).
616 Cardoza, 2011 WL 2447523, at *3; see also Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540
U.S. 644, 656 (2003).
617 Cardoza, 2011 WL 2447523, at *4.
611 Id. After discovery, both parties agreed that when Ms. Cardoza-Sori became
ill, Spirit flight attendants made a call over the public address (PA) system re-
questing medical assistance.
619 Id. at *5.
620 Id.
621 634 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Menlo, in turn, contracted with Qantas Airways, Ltd. (Qantas) to
perform the actual carriage of the engine to its destination.
When the engine arrived in Los Angeles on or about November
19, however, it was not in the same condition as when it had left
New Zealand; it had been damaged sometime during transporta-
tion. The engine's owner subsequently filed a claim with its in-
surer, Chubb Insurance Co. of Europe, S.A. (Chubb), for the
resulting loss. Chubb paid the owner $119,666.62.622
Chubb then recovered $80,000 from Menlo's successor-in-in-
terest, UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. (UPS), after which UPS
filed a third-party complaint against Qantas seeking indemnifi-
cation and contribution for sums UPS paid to Chubb.6 23 The
district court dismissed UPS's third-party complaint, reasoning
that the claims against Qantas were untimely since they were not
brought within two years as required under Article 35 of the
Montreal Convention. 624 The Ninth Circuit held that "the 'right
to damages' referenced in Article 35 [was] the cause of action
under the Montreal Convention by which a passenger or con-
signor may hold a carrier liable for damage sustained to passen-
gers, baggage, or cargo. "625 However, UPS did not seek
compensation for damage sustained to the engine, but rather
indemnification (and contribution) from Qantas for sums paid to
Chubb.
626
Despite UPS lacking a "right of damages" under Article 35,
the Ninth Circuit found that UPS was entitled to a "right of re-
course" against Qantas as provided in Article 37.627 Therefore,
"because [the] action between carriers for indemnification or
contribution [was] premised on the 'right of recourse,' rather
than the 'right to damages,' Article 35's time bar [did] not ap-
ply," and the timing of UPS's action should have been governed
622 Id. at 1025.
623 Id.
624 Id. at 1025-26. Article 35 of the Montreal Convention states: "The right to
damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within a period of two
years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination, or from the date on
which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date on which the carriage
stopped." See Montreal Convention, supra note 599, art. 35.
625 Chubb, 634 F.3d at 1026.
626 Id.
627 Id. at 1027. Article 37, entitled "Right of recourse against third parties,"
provides: "Nothing in this [c]onvention shall prejudice the question whether a
person liable for damage in accordance with its provisions has a right of recourse
against any other person." Montreal Convention, supra note 599, art. 37.
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by local law.6 28 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit noted that Article
35 only mandated that "the right to damages shall be extin-
guished if an action is not brought within a period of two years,"
but "[did] not require that 'all actions' relating to a particular
event must be brought within two years. '6 29 Furthermore, the
Ninth Circuit, in reversing the district court, was not persuaded
to follow pre-Montreal Convention precedent interpreting Arti-
cle 29 of the Warsaw Convention."'
In Dorton v. Hendrick Motorsports, Inc.,63 1 the plaintiff, as per-
sonal representative of the estate of Randall Alexander Dorton,
filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was
"'against the great weight of the evidence,' [was] based on false
evidence, and would [have] result[ed] in a miscarriage of jus-
tice. '63 2 The "case involve [ed] claims arising out of the crash of
a Beechcraft Super King Air 200 turboprop aircraft on October
24, 2004 as it attempted to land at the Martinsville, Virginia, air-
port."6 3 The plaintiff implicated the Warsaw Convention by re-
lying on two cases in her argument that the "pilot's failure to
continuously monitor [the] aircraft's navigational instruments
during [Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)] conditions constituted
willful, wanton, and reckless negligence."634
The first case, Koirala, "was a bench trial applying the 'willful
misconduct' standard under the Warsaw Convention to the con-
duct of pilots of a Thai Airways flight that crashed into the
mountains near Kathmandu, Nepal, in 1992.11635 "Willful mis-
conduct" under the Warsaw Convention, as applied in Koirala,
meant that a carrier or agent must have acted either "(1) with
628 Id. The Ninth Circuit found that Article 45 supports this, stating "[Article
45] provides that 'an action for damages may be brought... against [the actual]
carrier or the contracting carrier, or against both together or separately. If the
action is brought against only one of those carriers, that carrier shall have the
right to require the other carrier to be joined in the proceedings, the procedure
and effects being governed by the law of the court seized of the case.' " Id.
629 Id.
630 Id. at 1028. Article 35 of the Montreal Convention is largely identical to
Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention. Compare Montreal Convention, supra note
599, art. 35, with Warsaw Convention, supra note 600, art. 29.
631 Dorton v. Hendrick Motorsports, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 2d 870 (M.D.N.C.
2011).
632 Id. at 873.
633 Id.
634 Id. at 878.
635 Id. (citing Koirala v. Thai Airways Int'l., Nos. C-94-2644SC, C-95-0082SC,
1996 WIL 40243, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 1205, 1207 (9th
Cir. 1997)).
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knowledge that its action would probably result in injury or
death, or (2) in conscious or reckless disregard of the fact that
death or injury would be the probable consequences of its ac-
tion. ' 636 The court distinguished Koirala by the fact that, there,
the pilots failed to scan any of their instruments for over five
minutes, totally oblivious to the fact that they were headed
straight into a mountain, and the trial court's finding of willful
misconduct on those facts was affirmed on the deferential stan-
dard of not being "clearly erroneous. '"637
The second case, In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1,
1983, resulted in a verdict finding that the deaths of those on
board Korean Air Lines Flight 007, which was shot down by So-
viet military aircraft after straying 360 miles off course, was prox-
imately caused by the "wilful misconduct" of the flight crew.6 :8
The court distinguished In re Korean Air Lines by the facts that
"the pilots failed to monitor their navigational equipment for
over five hours, and the aircraft had strayed nearly 360 miles off
course into Soviet airspace."6 39
In finding for the defendant, the court found that, unlike the
pilots in Koirala and In re Korean Air Lines, there was evidence
that the pilots of the Beechcraft had "monitored at least some
(perhaps many) of their navigational instruments during their
attempt to land at [Martinsville]. "640 "Moreover, while both
cases upheld a finding of liability, neither Koirala nor In re Ko-
rean Air Lines held that a contrary finding would have been
against the clear weight of the evidence."64' The court denied
the plaintiff's motion for a new trial.642
In Goodwin v. British Airways PLC,643 the plaintiff sought dam-
ages under the Montreal Convention after sustaining a fractured
ankle when another passenger bumped into her as she was exit-
ing the aircraft, causing her to fall.6 44 "In seeking summary
636 Id. at 879 n.9 (quoting Koirala, 1996 WL 40243, at *5).
637 Id.
638 Id. (citing In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 156 F.R.D. 18, 19
(D.D.C. 1994)). The court in In re Korean Air Lines likewise used the Warsaw





642 Id. at 886.
643 Goodwin v. British Airways PLC, No. 09-10463, 2011 WL 3475420 (D. Mass.
Aug. 8, 2011).
644 Id. at *1.
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judgment, [the defendant] argue[d] that the event that caused
the plaintiffs fall was not an 'accident' within the meaning of
Article 17."645
In Massachusetts, where Goodwin was tried, courts use a two-
step analysis to determine whether an incident is an "accident"
within the meaning of Article 17.646 The evidence must demon-
strate "that (1) an unusual or unexpected event that was exter-
nal [to the plaintiff] occurred, and (2) this event was a
malfunction or abnormality in the aircraft's operation. '"647 The
court found that "where, as [there], an injury results from a
physical collision with another passenger," beyond mere jos-
tling, the event is "'quintessentially external' and satisfies the
first prong of the 'accident' analysis."64 However, the court
found that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the second prong, citing
a lack of evidence that would require the flight crew's assistance
during disembarkation.6 49 The incident, therefore, was not
within the purview or control of the airline since "'a flight crew
is in no better position to detect and avoid the dangers inherent
in walking' than its passengers. "650
In Heinemann v. United Continental Airlines,6 51 the plaintiff
brought suit against the defendant based on an incident that
occurred at the conclusion of a flight from Amsterdam to Seat-
tle, resulting in the plaintiffs arrest as he disembarked.15 2 The
defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that,
inter alia, the plaintiffs claims were preempted by the Montreal
Convention.655
The court found that the flight on which the incident oc-
curred met the Article 2 definition of "international carriage. 654
The fact that the plaintiffs flight had a stopover in Chicago and
645 Id.
646 Id. at *4.
647 Id.; see also Gotz v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 199, 201-02 (D.
Mass. 1998); Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985).
648 Goodwin, 2011 WL 3475420, at *4-5; see also Garcia Ramos v. Transmeridian
Airlines, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 137, 141 (D.P.R. 2005).
649 Goodwin, 2011 WL 3475420, at *6.
650 Id. (quoting Garcia Ramos, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 143).
651 No. 2:11-CV-00002-MJP, 2011 WL 2144603 (W.D. Wash. May 31, 2011).
652 Id. at *1.
653 Id. at *2.
654 Id. at *3. "[A]ny carriage in which ... the place of departure and the place
of destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a transship-
ment, are situated ... within the territories of two [s]tates [p]arties .... Mon-
treal Convention, supra note 599, art. 2.
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that the incident occurred at the conclusion of the Chicago-Se-
attle leg of the flight did not alter the "international carriage"
nature of the flight.655 The court abided by the Ninth Circuit's
prior holdings that the "Warsaw Convention (the predecessor
agreement to the Montreal Convention) preempt[ed] any inde-
pendent state-law claims arising out of an incident occurring
during 'international carriage.' "656
The court then determined whether the plaintiff was entitled
to relief under the provisions of the Montreal Convention for
any "accident" without a showing of "bodily injury. ' 657 The
court's "review of [the] [p]laintiff's complaint (as well as every
pleading he had filed since initiating the complaint) reveal[ed]
no allegations of bodily injury arising out of any behavior he
allege[d] on the part of [the] [d]efendant's employees. 6 5 In
granting summary judgment, the court found that the plaintiff
was not entitled to recover under the terms of the Montreal
Convention for any psychological or emotional damage he may
have sustained.659
In Lavergne v. Atis Corp.,66 0 families of individuals who died in
a plane crash, which departed the Dominican Republic bound
for San Juan, Puerto Rico, brought actions against the air car-
rier, Atis, under the Montreal Convention, seeking to recover
damages for the individuals' wrongful deaths and for their own
pain and suffering. 661 The air carrier and its insurer moved to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.66 Article 1 (1) of
the Montreal Convention provides: "This convention applies to
all international carriage of persons, baggage or cargo per-
formed by aircraft for reward. It applies equally to gratuitous
carriage by aircraft performed by an air transport
undertaking. "663
The defendants, in their motion to dismiss, argued that the
"Montreal Convention, like its predecessor, only applie[d] to
commercial international flights. '664 "They contended that the
655 Heinemann, 2011 WL 2144603, at *3.
656 Id.; see also Carey v. United Airlines, 255 F.3d 1044, 1054 (9th Cir. 2001); El
Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999).
6 7 Heinemann, 2011 WL 2144603, at *4.
658 Id.
65. Id. at *4-5.
660 767 F. Supp. 2d 301 (D.P.R. 2011).
66, Id. at 303.
662 Id. at 302.
663 Id. at 305 (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 599, art. 1(1)).
664 Id.
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wording variations between Article 1(1) of the Montreal Con-
vention and Article 1.1 of the Warsaw Convention [were] due to
French-English translation differences that did not substan-
tively affect their scope. '665 Specifically, they argued, that "the
concepts of air transport 'undertaking' and 'enterprise' both re-
ferred to air transport businesses, not private flights carried out
for friends. 666
The "[p]laintiffs argue[d] that the [d]efendants' motions to
dismiss [were] 'premised on the incorrect proposition that the
terms of the Montreal Convention are the same as those of the
treaty which it substituted, the Warsaw Convention.' ,,667 Accord-
ing to the plaintiffs, the purposes of the Montreal and Warsaw
Conventions vary widely.668 "Specifically, they point[ed] out
that the Warsaw Convention sought to 'limit the liability of air
carriers in order to foster the growth of the fledgling commer-
cial aviation industry,' whereas the Montreal Convention
[sought] to ensure the protection of passengers and consumers
in international carriage by air. '6 69 The "[p]laintiffs further
contend[ed] that a comparison of Article [1(1)] of the Mon-
treal Convention, and Article [1.1] of the Warsaw Convention
show[ed] that the latter is limited to commercial airlines, while
the former may encompass private flights.... 670
The court found that there was "no substantial change in the
meaning of the provisions after their translation to English inso-
far as both refer[red] to gratuitous carriage performed by a
company or legally constituted body in the air transport busi-
ness."67' As such, the court determined that the "case law inter-
preting the Warsaw provision [was] binding precedent when
analyzing Article 1 (1) of the Montreal Convention."672
The court determined that the plane was not used for com-
mercial purposes, that the "deceased passengers did not pay a
fare to be transported by Atis," and that "Atis operated the plane
under Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, which gov-





669 Id. at 305-06.
670 Id. at 306.
671 Id. at 308.
672 Id.
673 Id. at 308-09.
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ultimately found that Atis did not operate as an air transport
undertaking as contemplated by Article 1(1) of the Montreal
Convention and therefore dismissed the plaintiffs' claims under
the Montreal Convention and granted the defendants' motion
to dismiss.674
In Phifer v. Icelandair, 1 75 the plaintiff, Phifer, sought to recover
damages under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention for inju-
ries she sustained after striking her head against a television
monitor on the defendant's plane.6 76 "After entering her as-
signed row. .. , [the plaintiff] placed two carry-on bags under
the seat in front of hers, stood up, and struck her head on an
overhead television monitor, which was extended in the down
position. ' 677 The defendant won summary judgment when the
district court required the plaintiff to provide evidence that the
airline had failed to meet FAA requirements. 6 78
Judge Bybee declared that Icelandair would only be liable to
Phifer if her injury was caused by an accident-in that case, the
television monitors being down during boarding.6 79 Accord-
ingly, liability would attach if the "television monitor's being in a
down position during boarding (1) was an unexpected or unu-
sual event or happening that (2) was external to Phifer and (3)
caused her injuries. ' 680 The Ninth Circuit found that the dis-
trict court erred in granting summary judgment to Icelandair on
the grounds that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that the
defendant's conduct was in violation of FAA requirements.
681
According to Judge Bybee, "[w] e have never held that a viola-
tion of FAA requirements is a prerequisite to suit under Article
17. "682
674 Id. at 309-10.
675 652 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2011), as amended on denial of reh'g (Sept. 1, 2011).
676 Id. at 1223.
677 Id.
678 Id.
679 Id. at 1224 (citing Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 398-99 (1985) (requiring
courts to focus their attention on the "accident which caused the passenger's in-
jury, and not to [the] accident which is the passenger's injury... impl[ying] that,
however we define 'accident,' it is the cause of the injury that must satisfy the
definition rather than the occurrence of the injury alone.")).
680 Id.
681 Id.
682 Id.; see also Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2002)
(finding Article 17 liability without any evidence the airline failed to meet FAA
requirements), affd, 540 U.S. 644 (2004); Prescod v. AMR, Inc., 383 F.3d 861,
868 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (also finding Article 17 liability without any
evidence the airline failed to meet FAA requirements).
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In Ramos v. American Airlines, Inc.,68 3 the "plaintiff allege [d]
that she sustained injuries ... while in the process of boarding
an international flight from Charlotte Douglas International
Airport to Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic." '684 The plain-
tiff alleged that, while rendering wheelchair assistance to board
her flight, the defendants, Charlotte Skycap Service, Inc. and
one of its employees, "caused and/or allowed [her] to lose her
balance and fall.... 68
"In support of the [defendants'] motion for summary judg-
ment, [the] defendants contend[ed] that th[e] action [was]
governed by the Montreal Convention and [was], thus, time-
barred under the [c]onvention's two-year statute of limita-
tions." '686 The "[pilaintiff contend[ed] . .. that the Montreal
Convention [did] not apply." '687 Article 17 of the Montreal Con-
vention states that a "carrier is liable for damage sustained in
case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon condition
only that the accident which caused the death or injury took
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the opera-
tions of embarking or disembarking. '' 68 8 "[W]here it applies,
the Montreal Convention is the exclusive means for recovery of
damages suffered in the course of international air travel and
preempts all state law claims." '689
"The only disputed issue on . . . [the] motion for summary
judgment [was] whether the plaintiff was in the process of 'em-
barking' the plane when she was injured. ' 690 The court consid-
ered the following factors: "(1) the activity of the passenger at
the time of the accident; (2) the restrictions, if any, on the pas-
sengers' movement; (3) the imminence of actual boarding; and
(4) the physical proximity of the passengers to the gate."69
The court determined that the plaintiff was in the process of
"embarking" as she had been "checked in under all the guide-
lines and protocols of an international passenger and was issued
a boarding pass for her final destination....692 The court also
683 No. 3:11cv207, 2011 WL 5075674 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 25, 2011).
684 Id. at *1.
685 Id.
686 Id. at *2.
687 Id.
688 Montreal Convention, supra note 599, art. 17(1).
689 Ramos, 2011 VL 5075674, at *2; see also El Al Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525
U.S. 155, 161 (1999).
690 Ramos, 2011 WL 5075674, at *2.
691 Id.
692 Id. at *3.
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made note of the plaintiffs repeated allegations in her
amended complaint that she had suffered injuries while "board-
ing" her flight.193
In Rogers v. Continental Airlines, Inc.," 4 the plaintiff asserted
state-law claims for tort and breach of contract "based on her
removal by defendant Continental Airlines, Inc. from a flight
bound from Newark to Cancun, Mexico."6 95 "Continental re-
moved th[e] case to federal court and... move [d] for summary
judgment," asserting that the plaintiffs claims were preempted
by the Montreal Convention and that the plaintiff "fail[ed] to
state a viable ... [claim] under the convention." '696
Under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention, "airline liability
for passenger injury in international travel attaches only when 'a
passenger suffers: (1) bodily injury in (2) an accident that oc-
curred while (3) on board, embarking, or disembarking.' 697
The court found that the "relevant timeframe for analyzing the
[plaintiffs injuries was] the period when she was on the plane
and in the jetway," which the court considered as "disembark-
ing" in that the plaintiff was "actually physically exiting the
plane. '6 98 Summarily, the court found that the plaintiffs ac-
tions brought her within the purview of the Montreal Conven-
tion, thereby preempting her state-law claims.699 The court also
found that the plaintiff was barred from recovery under the
Montreal Convention "because, inter alia, she did not sustain
any bodily injury within the meaning of Article 17."'70 0
In Rubin v. Air China Ltd.,7°' the plaintiff filed a claim under
the "Passenger Compensation Rights for International Flights"
provision of the Montreal Convention against the defendant, al-
leging the following damages due to a thirteen and one-half-
hour delay on Air China Flight 985 from Beijing, China to San
Francisco, California:
693 [d.
694 No. 10-3064(KSH), 2011 WL 4407441 (D.NJ. Sept. 21, 2011).
695 Id. at *1.
696 Id. at *1-3.
69" Id. at *4 (citing Schaefer-Condulmari v. U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., No. 09-
1146, 2009 WL 4729882, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2009); Terrafranca v. Virgin At.
Airways Ltd., 151 F.3d 108, 110 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,
499 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1991))).
6'1 Rogers, 2011 WL 4407441, at *5.
699 Id.
700 Id. at *6.
701 No. 5:10-CV-05110-LHK, 2011 WL 2463271 (N.D. Cal..June 21, 2011).
350
2012] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
(1) pain and suffering; (2) lost work; (3) physical illness with at-
tendant medical treatment costs; (4) "being trapped in a freezing
Beijing airport that was worse than a prisoner would be treated";
(5) the cost of [the] [p]laintiff s round-trip ticket from San Fran-
cisco to Beijing; and (6) the cost of a late-night taxi from the San
Francisco airport.
7 °2
The parties agreed that Article 19 of the Montreal Convention
governed the plaintiffs claims.70 3 The defendant filed a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, seeking to limit the plaintiffs
recovery to out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a result of the
delay.
70 4
Under Article 19, a "carrier is liable for damage occasioned by
delay in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage or cargo.7 0 5
However, the court granted the defendant's motion in part.711
The court found that the plaintiff could not recover on his
claim for pain and suffering as Article 19 excludes damages for
"purely emotional injuries" caused by delay.707 The court, how-
702 Id. at *1-2. This case was originally filed in the Small Claims Division of the
Santa Clara County Superior Court on September 30, 2010. Defendant Air
China removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), which per-
mits foreign sovereigns to remove any civil action to federal court under 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a)-(b). The plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case back to
state court on the grounds that (1) Air China failed to give timely notice of the
removal and file a copy of the notice with the clerk of the state court and (2)
even if Air China properly removed under Section 1441(d) as a foreign sover-
eign, the court should remand the claims against domestic defendant United
Airlines. In a prior decision denying the plaintiffs motion, the court found (1)
that Air China's eight-day delay in notifying the parties and the state court did
not constitute a procedural defect warranting remand and (2) that the Ninth
Circuit has held that a foreign entity can remove an entire action, not simply the
claims against it, and that claims arising tinder the Montreal Convention fall
within the grant of federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Rubin v. Air China, Ltd., No. 10-CV-05110-LHK, 2011 WL 1002099, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 21, 2011).
703 Rubin, 2011 WL 2463271, at *2.
704 Id. at *1.
705 Id. at *2. A carrier can avoid liability "for damage occasioned by delay if it
proves that it and its servants and agents took all measures that could reasonably
be required to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for it or them to take
such measures." Id.
706 Id. at *5.
707 Id. at *2; see also Daniel v. Virgin Ad. Airways Ltd., 59 F. Supp. 2d 986, 992
(N.D. Cal. 1998); Elnajjar v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., Nos. H-04-680, H-04-681, 2005 WL
1949545, at *4 n.5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2005) ("Because [the] [p]laintiffs [did]
not allege that they suffered any economic loss or physical injury ... they [could
not] meet the conditions for recovery under Article 19"); Ikekpeazu v. Air Fr.,
No. 3:04 CV 00711(RNC), 2004 WL 2810063, at *1-2 (D. Conn. Dec. 6, 2004)
("dismissing [the] plaintiffs claims for emotional injury under Article 19").
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ever, allowed the plaintiff to pursue recovery on his claims for
lost work, physical illness and medical expenses, and the cost of
his taxi home from the San Francisco airport, as these were con-
sidered financial injuries suffered by the plaintiff as the result of
Air China's delay. 708
In Sewer v. Liat (1974) Ltd.,79 the plaintiff asserted claims of
discrimination, defamation, and intentional or negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress when he was prevented from flying his
ticketed route from Tortola, British Virgin Islands to Antigua.
710
The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
plaintiffs claims should fail because they arose "from his at-
tempted travel on an airplane operated by a foreign airline in a
foreign country. "711
"'[R] ecovery for.., personal injury suffered on board an air-
craft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking' in a foreign territory is governed exclusively by
the Montreal Convention and its predecessor, the Warsaw Con-
vention."7 2 Thus, "to be compensable under the [Montreal
and] Warsaw Convention[s], [the plaintiff] must have suffered
... physical injury" that was "proximately caused by an accident"
occurring while "on board [the] aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking. ''713 In grant-
ing summary judgment, the court relied on the fact that the
plaintiff failed to submit any evidence of discrimination and
freely admitted that no Liat employee or agent caused him any
injury. 714
In Souza v. American Airlines, Inc.,"1 5 a pro se plaintiff sought
damages for lost baggage and negligent infliction of emotional
708 Rubin, 2011 WL 2463271, at *3-5. Note that the court granted the defen-
dant's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the plaintiffs claim for his
time spent "trapped" in the Beijing Airport, although the court granted the plain-
tiff leave to amend this claim to include an economic component as "damages for
inconvenience do not fall within the rubric of 'emotional distress."' Id. at *4
(quoting Daniel, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 994).
709 No. 04-76, 2011 WL 635292 (D.V.I. Feb. 16, 2011).
710 Id. at *1. The plaintiff was eventually escorted from the flight and hand-
cuffed by an off-duty police officer after becoming unruly. Id.
711 Id.
712 Id. at *2; see also El Al Isr. Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 161 (1999) (citing
Warsaw Convention, supra note 600); Acevedo-Reinoso v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de
Espana S.A., 449 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 2006).
713 Sewer, 2011 WI, 635292, at *3 (citing Langadinos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 199
F.3d 68, 70 n.2 (1st Cir. 2000) (citation omitted)).
714 Id. at *3-4.
715 No. 10 Civ. 5938(DAB)(KNF), 2011 WL 2749086 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011).
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distress after American Airlines lost baggage checked by the
plaintiff on a flight from New York to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.7"6
American Airlines sought a "determination that its liability...
[would] not, as a matter of law, exceed the limits set forth in the
[Montreal] Convention .... currently set at 1,131 Special Draw-
ing Rights (SDRs)," which is equivalent to roughly $1,741.717
Because the United States and Brazil were both signatories to
the Montreal Convention, the plaintiffs state-law claim of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress was preempted by the terms
of the Montreal Convention, leaving the plaintiffs claim for lost
baggage for disposition by the court.718
Article 17 of the Montreal Convention states that "a carrier is
liable for damage sustained in case of destruction or loss of...
checked baggage upon condition only that the event which
caused the destruction, loss or damage took place . . . during
any period within which the checked baggage was in the charge
of the carrier. ' 719 However, liability of the carrier is limited to
1,131 SDRs unless the "passenger[ ] made, at the time" of check-
ing her baggage, "a special declaration of interest in delivery at
destination. "720 Since the plaintiff failed to submit evidence of a
declaration of interest while checking her baggage, Magistrate
Judge Kevin Fox limited her recovery to the statutory 1,131
SDRs.72'
In Walsh v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N. V.,722 the
plaintiff sought damages under the Montreal Convention for in-
juries he sustained to his elbow after tripping over a low-lying
metal bar in the Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam. 72 ' The defen-
716 Id. at *1.
717 Id.
718 Id. at *2-3 ("analyzing language in the Warsaw Convention, [n]early identi-
cal to that in the Montreal [C]onvention, and concluding there is no 'recovery
for purely mental injuries'"); see also ElAl Isr. Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 175
(1999); Ginsberg v. Am. Airlines, No. 09 Civ. 3226(LTS)(KNF), 2010 WL
3958843, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2010); E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530,
534 (1991).
719 Souza, 2011 AL 2749086, at *3.
720 Id. (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 599, art. 22). Pursuant to
Article 24, the 1,000 SDR limit was raised to 1,131 SDRs on December 30, 2009.
Id.
72, The plaintiff failed to object to Judge Fox's report and recommendation
within fourteen days as provided in his report. The recommendation was ulti-
mately adopted by the district judge. Souza v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 10 Civ.
5938(DAB)(KNP), 2011 WL 3251575, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2011).
722 No. 09-civ-01803(RKE), 2011 WL 4344158 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011).
723 Id. at *1.
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dant moved for summary judgment arguing that it "did not ex-
ert control over the [plaintiff] and, therefore, he could not have
been embarking" within the meaning of Article 17.72
"The Montreal Convention creates strict liability for an air car-
rier when bodily injury occurs in the course of 'any operations
of embarking' as a result of an 'accident.' 7 25 Although courts
have employed a three-part test to determine whether an injury
took place while "embarking," the court in Walsh chose to focus
mainly on the control exercised by the airline over the
individual.726
In denying summary judgment, the court found that a reason-
able jury could find that the defendant was exercising control
over the plaintiff as he (1) was "seated at the departure gate
when two boarding calls were made," (2) "stood up in order to
join a group of passengers assembled near the gate after [hear-
ing the] boarding calls," and (3) took steps toward surrendering
his boarding pass. 27 Although the plaintiff's injury took place
forty-five minutes prior to his flight, this was not fatal to his "em-
barking" claim considering the international nature of the
flight.
728
As for the defendant's argument that the low-lying metal bar
was an expected object and the plaintiff therefore was not in-
jured as the result of an "accident," the court found that the
trier of fact could conclude that the bar was an unexpected ob-
ject, as it had protruded past the seating area and was of a color
similar to that of the floor.729
In Tewes v. Gulf Air,7 ° the plaintiffs sought damages for
breach of contract when they were forced to fly coach on an
alternate flight from Bahrain to Dubai after Gulf Air cancelled
724 Id. at *1-2.
725 Id. at *1 (citing Montreal Convention, supra note 599, art. 17).
726 Id. at *2 (The three-part test examines "(1) the control the airline had over
the passenger; (2) the activities of the passenger; and (3) the location of the
passenger." Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975)).
727 Id. at *3.
728 Id. Recall Ramos, where the court found that the plaintiff was in the process
of "embarking" as she had been "checked in under all the guidelines and proto-
cols of an international passenger and was issued a boarding pass for her final
destination." Ramos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-207, 2011 WL 5075674, at
*3.
729 Walsh, 2011 WL 4344158, at *4-5.
730 Tewes v. Gulf Air, No. H-10-1685, 2011 WL 649532 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 10,
2011).
354
2012] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 355
their original flight for which they had business class seats.7 '
The "[p]laintiffs allege [d] that, in return for their agreement to
accept coach class tickets, Gulf Air's supervisor told them they
could use their business class tickets at a later date. '732 "When
[the] plaintiffs attempted to use the tickets, Gulf Air refused. 7
33
Gulf Air removed the action from state court after arguing
that the plaintiffs' claims were "premised upon international
carriage, and [were], in effect, claims arising from a delay that
must [have been] brought pursuant to the Montreal
Convention. 734
The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the court's order
denying remand, urging, inter alia, "that their claim [was] for
non-performance of a contract of carriage and [was], therefore,
not covered under the Montreal Convention .... " In fact, the
"plaintiffs had no complaint until more than a month after the
flight was completed when Gulf Air refused to honor its alleged
agreement to permit the plaintiffs to reuse their business class
tickets. 736
In granting the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the
court found that the plaintiffs' claim fell outside the provisions
of the Montreal Convention, which therefore did not preempt
the plaintiffs' state-law claim for breach of contract.73 7 The
court reasoned that the plaintiffs did not assert that they had
suffered damages arising from a delay in international transpor-
tation; rather, the plaintiffs claimed damages arising from a
"complete refusal by Gulf Air to transport [them] more than a
month removed from [Gulf Air's] cancelled flight.... 738
IX. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In City of Santa Monica v. FAA,v3 9 the City of Santa Monica en-
acted an ordinance banning Category C and D aircraft (gener-
ally, business and executive jets with approach speeds of 121
knots or greater at maximum landing weight) from using the





736 Id. at *2.
737 Id. at *3.
738 Id.
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Santa Monica municipal airport except in emergencies.74 ° The
airport had a single runway and "serve [d] general aviation ...
and as a reliever airport for Los Angeles International Air-
port. ' 741 In the 1980s, the city sought to close the airport en-
tirely; however, after litigation, the city and the FAA reached an
agreement by which the airport remained open.742 Later grants
of federal money to the city incorporated the terms of this
agreement and required Santa Monica to make the airport avail-
able for use on "fair and reasonable terms and without unjust
discrimination, to all types, kinds, and classes of aeronautical
uses."743 Later grants of federal money to the city incorporated
this promise in the grant agreements. 4
After Santa Monica passed the ordinance in March 2008, the
city and the FAA proceeded through an administrative review
process, which resulted in the FAA's determination that the
"[o]rdinance was invalid for two reasons: because Congress's
grant of exclusive authority to the FAA to regulate aviation safety
preempt[ed] the [o]rdinance and because the [o]rdinance vio-
late[d] [the city's] contractual obligations under" the grant
agreements.745 Santa Monica filed a petition for review of the
FAA's action in the D.C. Circuit.746
After reviewing the evidence in the record, the court of ap-
peals upheld the FAA's decision and denied the petition:
"[A]pplying the Administrative Procedure Act's highly deferen-
tial standard of review, we conclude that the FAA did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously when it concluded that 'the discrimi-
natory restriction against operators of Categories C and D air-
craft [was] unjust and not necessary for the safe operation of
[the airport].' ",747 Since the agency's action could be upheld on
these grounds, the court of appeals declined to consider the
constitutional question of preemption.748
Barnes v. U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)749 arose from
a petition challenging an FAA order clearing the way for con-
struction of a new runway at Hillsboro Airport (HIO), twelve
740 Id. at 552.
741 Id. at 551.
742 Id. at 551-52.
743 Id. at 552.
744 Id.
745 Id. at 553.
746 Id. at 551.
747 Id. at 559 (citations omitted).
748 Id.
749 655 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2011).
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miles west of downtown Portland, Oregon. 750  The order
(known as a "finding of no significant impact") exempted the
Port of Portland, which was building the runway, from having to
prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS). 75 1 The peti-
tioners alleged that the FAA failed to consider the environmen-
tal impact of increased traffic following the construction and
that the petitioners, local residents, were not given a proper
public hearing as required by 49 U.S.C. § 47106(c)(1)(A)(i). 752
The court of appeals granted the petition and remanded.75 3
The court found that the record demonstrated that "the [Port
of Portland and the FAA] had independent knowledge of a rea-
sonable possibility that increasing capacity at HIO would lead to
increased demand, but chose to gloss over it."'7 54 The possibility
of increased demand and of the accompanying impact on the
environment meant that the FAA erred by not requiring an
EIS.7 55 However, the court found that the two-hour "open
house" format used by the FAA for a public hearing was suffi-
cient, since the meeting was "under the direction of a desig-
nated hearing officer for the purpose of allowing the members
of the public to 'speak and hear' about the project. "756
Judge Sandra Segal Ikuta dissented, finding that the petition-
ers had waived their argument about increased demand, and
that, in any event, deference was owed to the FAA's determina-
tion. 75 7 She deemed the ruling counter-productive from an en-
vironmental standpoint as well:
It is conventional wisdom among aviators that "when the weight
of the paper equals the weight of the airplane, only then you can
go flying." The majority confirms the truth of this quotation:
here a federal agency is trying to reduce airport delays and the
concomitant negative environmental effects by commencing a
project in anticipation of future growth, and the majority sides
with delay and air pollution by imposing pointless paperwork on
the agency before the necessary project can go forward.758
750 Id. at 1126.
751 Id. at 1129-30.
752 Id. at 1130-31.
753 Id. at 1143.
754 Id. at 1134.
755 Id. at 1136-39.
756 Id. at 1142.
757 Id. at 1145-47 (IkutaJ., dissenting).
758 Id. at 1143.
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In Town of Barnstable v. FAA,75 9 a case arising out of the devel-
opment of the nation's first offshore wind farm, petitioners, the
town of Barnstable, Massachusetts and a non-profit organization
challenged the FAA's determination that the proposed wind tur-
bines would not pose a hazard to aircraft.7" The FAA defended
its determination and challenged the petitioners' standing.761
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found that the peti-
tioners had standing and that the "FAA ... misread its regula-
tions, leaving the challenged determinations inadequately
justified. '762 The court also determined that the FAA's determi-
nation influenced the Department of the Interior's decision to
lease the project area to the proposed wind farm's developer.763
The court of appeals began by examining the petitioners'
standing, applying the familiar three-part test of injury, causa-
tion, and redressability. 764 While the FAA acknowledged the ad-
equacy of the petitioners' injury claims, it argued that there was
no causation because (1) the FAA's decision had no enforceable
legal effect and (2) there was no redressability as it was the De-
partment of the Interior that was the ultimate decision-maker
regarding the lease of the project area to the developer.765 The
court rejected these arguments, finding that the Department of
the Interior frequently relied upon the decisions of the FAA,
took FAA hazard decisions "very, very seriously, ' 76 6 and incorpo-
rated FAA hazard determinations into its own formal decision-
making process.767 Thus, the petitioners could properly argue
that the FAA determination was a cause of the Department of
Interior's decision and that a different determination by the
FAA could have redressed the harm.768
After finding that the petitioners had standing to challenge
the decision, the court agreed with the petitioners that the
FAA's decision was "arbitrary and capricious" because it failed to
comport with the agency's own internal guidelines. 769 The
guidelines required the FAA to consider whether a structure
759 659 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
760 Id. at 30-31.
761 Jd. at 31.
762 Id.
763 Id. at 31-32.
764 Id. at 31.
765 Id. at 31-32.
766 Id. at 32.
767 Id. at 33-34.
768 Id.
769 Id. at 34.
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would have an adverse effect on Visual Flight Rules (VFR) oper-
ations in a variety of ways, including if it had an effect on the
operation of air navigation facilities due to "physical or electro-
magnetic radiation. ' 77° The FAA, however, in its published deci-
sion, referred only to a single portion of the handbook, which
stated that structures of under 500 feet were not VFR hazardous
and failed to address the other ways in which a structure can
interfere with VFR.7 7 ' As the wind turbines in that case were
below 500 feet, the FAA concluded that the turbines were not
hazardous and did not undergo further analysis.772
The FAA claimed that its guidebook contained "criteria rather
than rules to follow. '773 The court of appeals agreed; however,
it found that the FAA had applied a single section of the hand-
book in a mechanical fashion, ignored other parts of the hand-
book, and ultimately failed to acknowledge ways in which the
turbines could be hazardous.7 7 ' The court ruled that the FAA
was required to publish a ruling that dealt with the additional
issues raised in the case and that did not simply rely on a single
portion of the handbook.775
In Cooper v. NTSB,776 a pilot submitted a false statement in his
application for a medical certificate from the FAA by stating that
he had not been convicted of any charges involving driving
while intoxicated, when in fact, he had been charged with felony
driving under the influence, and his driver's license had been
suspended for six months.7 7 7 The FAA issued an emergency rev-
ocation of his pilot's license for making fraudulent and inten-
tionally false statements on his application for a medical
certificate, and the NTSB upheld the emergency revocation.778
The pilot, Mr. Cooper, testified that he had filled out the
paperwork provided to him by his doctor without reading it and
had failed to realize that it was asking whether he had a felony
conviction for driving under the influence. 779 The FAA used a
"willful disregard" standard, holding that Mr. Cooper's failure to
read the questions before answering them amounted to a form
770 Id. at 35.
771 Id.
772 Id.
773 Id. at 36.
774 Id.
775 Id.
776 660 F.3d 476 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
777 Id. at 479.
778 Id. at 480-81.
779 Id. at 480.
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of willful blindness sufficient to find that he had engaged in an
intentional falsification of his application for a medical applica-
tion.7"' The court agreed that this standard was appropriate,
and that, by failing to read the questions posed to him, Mr.
Cooper opened himself up to a charge of intentional falsifica-
tion."' Thus, the decision to grant an emergency revocation of
his pilot's license was upheld.782
In Manin v. NTSB,788 another pilot, Mr. Manin, faced an
emergency revocation of his pilot's license for intentional falsifi-
cation of his medical certification application provided to the
FAA. Mr. Manin had been charged with multiple disorderly
conduct citations, which he had failed to disclose.8 The deci-
sion to remove his pilot's license was upheld by the NTSB.7 5
The court of appeals vacated and remanded.7 6
The court reached its decision for two reasons. First, Mr.
Manin argued that the revocation of his license was barred
under the doctrine of laches since over twelve years had passed
since his first conviction.7 7 The FAA argued, contrary to prior
FAA case law, that the doctrine of laches can only apply in FAA
administrative appeals under the "stale complaint" doctrine.78 8
In fact, FAA precedent established that laches was an accepted
doctrine in similar cases, and the court of appeals ordered the
FAA to consider this doctrine when making its decision.789
The second issue was that Mr. Manin argued that he filled out
his paperwork improperly because he lacked understanding of
the applicable reporting requirements of the form.790 He be-
lieved that his disorderly conduct citations were summary of-
fenses and did not need to be reported. 9 While the FAA and
the NTSB rejected this argument, the court of appeals found
that, when deciding on intentional falsification, the subjective
state of mind of the defendant was an issue in that case.79 2 For
780 Id. at 483.
781 Id. at 485-86.
782 Id. at 486.
783 627 F.3d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
784 Id. at 1240-41.
785 Id. at 1240.
786 Id.
787 Id. at 1241-42.
788 Id. at 1242.
789 Id.
790 Id. at 1243-44.
791 Id.
792 Id. at 1244.
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these reasons, the court of appeals vacated the NTSB's decision
and sent the case back for further proceedings. 93
X. OTHER SUBJECT AREAS
A. INSURANCE
Trishan Air, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co.794 affirmed a district
court's decision that an insurer properly denied coverage for a
claim because the insured aircraft owner had failed to comply
with a policy provision requiring co-pilots to have specified
training.79 5 The aircraft in question was a corporate jet that, on
takeoff from Santa Barbara airport in 2007, ran off the runway
and was substantially damaged.71 6 The aircraft's owner filed a
claim for the damage with Federal Insurance Co. (Federal).797
The insurance policy had a pilot warranty endorsement that re-
quired all pilots of the covered aircraft to "have successfully
completed a ground and flight recurrent/initial training course
for the make and model operated within the past [eighteen]
months. Any such course must [have] incorporate [d] the use of
a motion-based simulator specifically designed for the insured
make and model/make and model series. '798 The policy ex-
cluded coverage for noncompliance with this provision.799 After
the insurer denied coverage based on this noncompliance, the
insured brought an action.8"' The district court entered sum-
mary judgment in the insurer's favor, and the insured
appealed.80 1
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 2 The evidence showed that the
co-pilot (who was not in command of the aircraft) had not un-
dertaken the required motion-based simulator training, al-
though he had thousands of hours of flight time and had
undertaken static cockpit training and other kinds of training8 0 3
The parties had stipulated that it did not matter whether or not
793 Id. at 1245.
794 635 F.3d 422 (9th Cir. 2011).
795 Id. at 424.
796 Trishan Air, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. CV-07-06204-RGK(FMOx), 2008 WL
5549453, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2008).
797 Tyishan Air, Inc., 635 F.3d at 424.
798 Id. at 425.
799 Id.
800 Id. at 426.
801 Id.
802 Id. at 424.
803 Id. at 425-26.
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the breach of the pilot warranty caused the accident."0 4 The
court of appeals determined that the pilot warranty was not a
"mere condition of the ... policy, . . . requiring . . . substantial
compliance," but rather "an element of the fundamental risk in-
sured. '8 0 5 Therefore, "strict compliance with pilot warranties
serves as a necessary corollary of aviation insurance policies,"
and the "failure to comply with any aspect of the required train-
ing for co-pilots completely undermined [the insurer's] ability
to negotiate and implement the terms of its policies."806 Be-
cause the insured "failed to comply with any aspect of the war-
ranty's required training for co-pilots," Federal was entitled to
deny coverage for the claim.80 7
B. SEPTEMBER 11 LITIGATION
In re September 11 Property Damage Litigation808 affirmed the dis-
trict court's approval of a settlement of cases brought by various
parties against the airlines, security companies, and aviation in-
dustry defendants based on property damage suffered in the
September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attacks."0 9 The appeal,
which was brought by non-settling plaintiffs, World Trade
Center Properties LLC and other affiliated entities, largely
turned on the interpretation of the Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act of 2001 (ATSSSA) 1" that was
passed in the wake of the attacks.
The appellants challenged the district court's application of
the "first come, first served" rule under New York law, which
generally allows insurers to settle as they see fit.81' They argued
that this state rule was preempted by ATSSSA's creation of a
"limited fund," and that they were entitled to an equitable
share.812 The court of appeals found this argument unsup-
ported by the statutory text and held that there was no preemp-
tion in that instance. 13 The court next affirmed the district
court's finding that the "settling parties [had] entered into their
8(4 Id. at 427 n.6.
805 Id. at 428 (internal quotation marks omitted).
80- Id. at 428-30.
807 Id. at 435.
808 650 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2011).
8-9 Id. at 155.
810 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006)).
811 In re Sept. 11 Prop. Damage Litig., 650 F.3d at 151.
812 Id.
813 Id. at 151-53.
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settlement agreement in good faith. ' 14 Finally, the court re-
jected the argument that the settlement amounts should not
have been credited to the settling defendants' respective liability
limits under ATSSSA:8 15 "[There], reading the term in context,
it [was] clear that 'liability' refers to a 'financial or pecuniary
obligation' that can arise through the settlement of claims." 1 6
C. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
In LeGrand v. United States,s17 the plaintiff-flight attendant
sought damages against the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act," 8 alleging that the FAA's air traffic controllers
"negligently failed to warn" the pilot of Southwest Airlines Flight
2745 "that severe turbulence was forecast."1 9 In passing, the
court found that under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1) (governing per-
sonal injury or wrongful-death actions against the United
States), the law of Ohio applied because the injury and the
FAA's alleged negligent conduct took place there. 20
D. TAImAC DELAY RULE
A November 14, 2011 consent order 21 between the DOT and
American Eagle Airlines, Inc. resulted in the first fine assessed
under the tarmac delay rule, which took effect in April 2011 and
generally does "not permit an aircraft to remain on the tarmac
for more than three hours" with certain safety and air traffic
control-related exceptions. 22 The fine totaled $900,000 and re-
sulted from delays at O'Hare (ORD) airport on May 29, 2011,
the day before Memorial Day. 8- Bad weather at the airport
caused departure delays, which then had a knock-on effect, de-
laying the ability of arriving flights to reach the terminal and
deplane. 24 The DOT blamed "American Eagle's overly optimis-
tic estimation of its ability to handle the number of flights it
chose to operate into ORD and its poor planning of its crew and
814 Id. at 153-54.
815 Id. at 154-55.
sJ6 Id. at 155.
817 774 F. Supp. 2d 910 (N.D. 111. 2011).
818 Id. at 912 (citing Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006)).
819 Id.
820 Id. at 918-19.
821 DEP'T OF TRANSP., CONSENT ORDER No. OST-2011-0003 (2011), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documen tDetail;D=DOT-OST-2011-0003-0061.
822 Id. at 1-2 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 259.4(b)(1) (2011)).
823 Id.
824 Id. at 3.
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gate resources" for causing "608 passengers to remain on air-
craft in excess of three hours without the opportunity to
deplane."825 According to the consent order, American Eagle
also paid $150,000 in compensation to the affected
passengers.8 26
Effective August 23, 2011, international flights at U.S. airports
are now generally prohibited from remaining on the tarmac for
more than four hours without deplaning, subject to the same
exceptions as the domestic rule. 27
s25 Id. at 4.
826 Id. at 5.
827 14 C.F.R. § 259.4(b) (2) (2011).
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